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I. INTRODUCTION
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the United States
experienced an unprecedented building spree." With the quickened pace of
housing construction came a dramatic innovation in residential housing devel-
opment: the emergence of the modern restricted residential subdivision. Across
the nation, developers large and small began to build blocks of uniformly
spaced and similarly constructed houses, separated from industrial and com-
mercial uses, and largely segregated by class and race.2
* Assistant Professor, The Ohio State University College of Law. The author
expresses appreciation to James Chandler, Charles Donahue, Robert Lynn, Earl Mur-
phy and Ruth Stoltzfus Jost who read and commented on drafts of this article; Dawn
Seiver, Lynn Nolan, John McCabe and Janet Kater who assisted with research; M.
Margaretann Newton who assisted with word processing; and Dean James Meeks and
The Ohio State University College of Law who provided funds to support this work.
1. See 2 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL
STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, Table N 111-117 (1975) [hereinafter cited as HIS-
TORICAL STATISTICS] (demonstrating that the rate of construction of urban dwelling
units increased dramatically in the 1880's and remained high until the 1930's).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 13-30, 168-230.
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Developers sought new legal tools to assure the restricted character of
these subdivisions. Eventually, such tools emerged: real covenants, equitable
servitudes, negative easements, and finally, zoning. But at the mid-nineteenth
century, public land use planning was largely non-existent. Even private re-
strictions were still nascent, undeveloped and, most important, unfamiliar to
most lawyers.' The lawyers advising the subdividers and developers of the pe-
riod faced a not uncommon problem: how does the legal counselor and drafter
satisfy the demand for new legal tools and doctrines emanating from changing
social and economic needs? The drafter of the period, and, more to the point,
the drafter's client, were not interested in providing a test case to extend the
common law precedents. Though creation of new legal tools through legisla-
tion was a conceivable solution, legislation was not always politically possible,
and was a less common approach to legal problems in the nineteenth century
than it is now. Ideally, the drafter could have received direction from the trea-
tise writers and law review commentators, who have always purported to guide
the profession. But these sources were not only far more scarce a century ago
than now, they were also even more out of touch with the needs of
practitioners.4
In the common law tradition, lawyers of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries looked to the existing cases and attempted to meet the
needs of their clients, the developers and subdividers, through extension or new
application of the tools they found. The defeasible fee was the tool chosen by
many lawyers who first considered the problem of restricting the new subdivi-
sions their clients were developing.5 During the late nineteenth and early twen-
tieth centuries, the defeasible fee became a common device for restricting land
use in most jurisdictions, ubiquitous in a few.6 Thousands, perhaps millions, of
deeds were written conveying property conditional on observance of various
land use restrictions.
The choice of the defeasible fee was on the whole unfortunate, indeed, a
disaster. The use of defeasible fees for restricting residential subdivisions
caused innumerable problems, some of which continue to plague us to the pre-
sent.7 Moreover, defeasible fee restrictions were seldom enforced by the courts,
at least through forfeiture, and thus did not directly achieve their restrictive
purpose.8 By the third decade of the twentieth century, the defeasible fee was
by and large abandoned as a land use planning device, though it continues to
3. See infra text accompanying notes 34-76 (describing the development of
other forms of private land use restrictions).
4. See infra text accompanying notes 276-279.
5. The term defeasible fee is used here in accordance with the RESTATEMENT
OF PROPERTY, ch. 4 (1936) to include the fee simple determinable, fee simple subject
to a condition subsequent, and fee simple subject to an executory limitation. For fur-
ther definitional discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 82-89.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 125-147.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 280-306.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 231-240.
696 [Vol. 49
2
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 49, Iss. 4 [1984], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol49/iss4/2
DEFEASIBLE FEE
surface in casebooks and treatises discussing private land use planning," and of
course, continues to be useful in other contexts. 10 Litigation involving the de-
feasible fee, however, seems to have helped point the way to other, more func-
tional, forms of deed restrictions that matured as the use of the defeasible fee
waned." In this respect, the defeasible fee may have played an important role
in the development of modern private land use planning.
This article tells the story of the emergence and decline of the defeasible
fee as a land use planning device. In doing so, it also examines the beginnings
of private residential land use planning in the United States. Finally, it seeks
to shed some light on the phenomenon of the development and dissemination
of legal knowledge and customs in a non-litigation context in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries. The article is based not only on cases and
literature from and about this period, but also on the author's review of deeds
from subdivisions spanning the period of 1870 to 1930 from four American
cities that were undergoing rapid expansion during the period. 2
9. See, e.g., R. WRIGHT & M. GITTELMAN, LAND USE, CASES AND MATERIALS
200-209 (3d ed. 1982).
10. Principally involving donations of property to charities or to government
entities.
11. See infra note 251 and accompanying text.
12. The author reviewed deeds found in the recording offices of Franklin
County (Columbus), Ohio; Suffolk County (Boston), Massachusetts; Cook County
(Chicago), Illinois; and the District of Columbia. In each office, at least five real estate
subdivisions were identified, the plats of which were recorded in the years 1870, 1880,
1890, 1900, 1910, 1920 and 1930. In Cook and Franklin counties it was necessary to
use plats from 1871 rather than 1870 because fires had destroyed earlier records.
While plats from 1930 were identified in all jurisdictions, 1930 is beyond the period
with which this article is concerned. Moreover, the paucity of sales and abundance of
foreclosures in 1930 subdivisions made data as to these subdivisions meaningless. To
eliminate from consideration partitions of small lots, only plats of subdivisions contain-
ing ten or more lots were considered. Subdivisions initiated by public entities were also
eliminated to assure comparability. Otherwise, subdivisions were selected more or less
in the order they appeared in the plat books or files. Once subdivisions were identified,
tract or grantor indexes were searched to locate deeds from the subdivider to purchas-
ers of lots in the tract. In most instances, deeds were found from at least four of the
five subdivisions. An effort was made to find three deeds for each subdivision. In a few
instances, it was not possible to determine from the grantor indexes whether deeds from
a subdivider were in fact for lots in the identified subdivision. In this situation, deeds
were located from the subdivider and period of the identified subdivision. Finally, all
identified deeds were read and restrictions within them noted. Where deeds are cited
below they are cited by book and page number, except in Cook County where they are
cited by document number.
For Franklin County, 7 deeds from 3 subdivisions were reviewed for 1871; 35
deeds from 11 subdivisions for 1880; 31 deeds from 8 subdivisions for 1890; 11 deeds
from 6 subdivisions for 1900; 6 deeds from 5 subdivisions for 1910; 18 deeds from 7
subdivisions for 1920; and 3 deeds from 2 subdivisions for 1930. For Suffolk County,
18 deeds from 8 subdivisions were reviewed for 1870; 11 deeds from 4 subdivisions for
1880; 14 deeds from 5 subdivisions for 1890; 16 deeds from 7 subdivisions for 1900; 12
deeds from 6 subdivisions for 1910; 8 deeds from 4 subdivisions for 1920 and 8 deeds
from 3 subdivisions for 1930. For the District of Columbia, 18 deeds from 7 subdivi-
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II. URBAN GROWTH IN THE LATE NINETEENTH AND EARLY TWENTIETH
CENTURIES
Three eras have been identified in the history of American urban develop-
ment. During the first phase, from colonial times until about 1860, urban
growth was constrained because the principal form of transportation in cities
was walking. 13 This made it necessary for most people to live close enough to
walk to the places where they worked, shopped and obtained services. 14 The
second phase of urban growth occurred during the second half of the nine-
teenth and the early twentieth centuries, as developments in transportation
technology made distinct and more widely spread residential districts possible.
First, the horse-drawn trolley car and steam-powered train, and later the elec-
tric railway and the elevated subway, radically expanded the scale of urban
development. 15 The third phase began about 1920, as the rapid proliferation of
the automobile further amplified the possibilities of suburban growth and con-
tributed to the creation of the modern metropolis. 6 This article focuses on the
second stage of development, from 1870 to 1920, during which the modern
residential subdivision was born.
Though innovations in transportation technology undoubtedly played a
major role in giving rise to the modern residential subdivision, several other
forces also converged to conceive and give a particular form to residential sub-
division development. First, other technical and economic changes gave impe-
tus to the building boom. In particular, the perfection of balloon frame con-
struction made possible efficient mass construction of residential dwellings in
the new subdivisions.' 7 Additionally, in the late nineteenth century, the devel-
opment of institutions and methods to provide capital for residential develop-
ment-in particular, for financing owner-occupied, single family dwell-
sions were reviewed for 1870; 10 deeds from 6 subdivisions for 1880; 17 deeds from 8
subdivisions for 1890; 12 deeds from 6 subdivisions for 1900; 29 deeds from 10 subdivi-
sions for 1910; 20 deeds from 6 subdivisions for 1920; and 21 deeds from 7 subdivisions
for 1930. For Cook County, 8 deeds from 5 subdivisions were reviewed for 1871; 12
deeds from 5 subdivisions for 1880; 14 deeds from 6 subdivisions for 1890; 9 deeds
from 5 subdivisions for 1900; 19 deeds from 7 subdivisions for 1910; 12 deeds from 5
subdivisions for 1920; and 6 deeds from 3 subdivisions for 1930.
13. C. GLAAB & A. BROWN, A HISTORY OF URBAN AMERICA 147 (1967); S.
WARNER, STREETCAR SUBURBS 15-17 (2d ed. 1978).
14. C. GLAAB & A. BROWN, supra note 13, at 147; S. WARNER, supra note 13,
at 19.
15. C. GLAAB & A. BROWN, supra note 13, at 147-54; S. MCMICHAEL & R.
BINGHAM, CITY GROWTH ESSENTIALS 139-150 (1928); T. SCHLESINGER, THE RISE OF
THE CITY, 1878-1898 108 (1933); L. SCHNORE, THE URBAN SCENE 82-84 (1965); see
also S. WARNER, supra note 13, at 21-34 (a thorough analysis of the development of
Boston during this period and of the role of street railways in this development).
16. C. GLAAB & A. BROWN, supra note 13, at 278-79, 281; S. MCMICHAEL &
R. BINGHAM, supra note 15, at 143, 150-53; L. SCHNORE, supra note 15, at 85-86; M.
SCOTT, AMERICAN CITY PLANNING SINCE 1890, at 185 (1969).
17. C. GLAAB & A. BROWN, supra note 13, at 143.
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ings-permitted unprecedented levels of residential construction and
purchase.18
18. The increasing availability of capital for residential construction was a pri-
mary factor driving rapid development of residential subdivisions during the period.
The basic form of financing for residential construction was the loan secured by a resi-
dential mortgage. From 1890 (the first date for which information is available) until
1920, the percentage of nonfarm, owner-occupied housing units subject to a mortgage
increased from 27.7% to 39.8%. HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 1, at Table N 302-
07. The land contract was a somewhat less common device for financing lots in subdivi-
sions during this period. E. FISHER, URBAN REAL ESTATE MARKETS, CHARACTERISTICS
AND FINANCING 27, 140 (1951).
The sources of home construction financing during the period were richly diverse.
A very common source was individual small investors who could themselves subdivide
small tracts or invest their savings in mortgages through mortgage or real estate
agents. J. BOYKIN, FINANCING REAL ESTATE 109 (1959); S. WARNER, supra note 13,
at 118-124. It was common for multiple mortgages to be held on the same property by
several different investors. S. WARNER, supra note 13, at 123. These mortgages were
for short terms, from a few months to three years. E. FISHER, supra at 19-20; S.
KLAMAN, THE POSTWAR RISE OF MORTGAGE COMPANIES 3-4 (1979); S. WARNER,
supra note 13, at 122. Loans advanced by individual investors, often arranged by real
estate agents, remained common throughout the period. See Parker, Creating a Local
Market for Small Mortgages, 4 ANNALS OF REAL EST. PRACTICE 119 (1925).
As the period progressed, however, institutional real estate financing became more
common. In 1896, the first date for which information is available, over half of the
outstanding residential nonfarm mortgage debt was held by noninstitutional lenders; by
1920, institutions held over 57% of the debt. HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 1,
Table N at 262-72. The most important home lending institutions at the outset of the
period were mutual savings banks, which pooled savings of their depositors to be used
for home mortgages and other investments. J. BOYKIN, supra at 29-30. Mutual savings
banks were particularly common in the Northeast. Id.
The modern savings and loan association, focused almost exclusively on first mort-
gage lending for local homes, evolved in the last decades of the nineteenth century from
earlier "terminating" or "serial" associations which pooled their members' funds to be
allocated to members for home construction. H. RUSSELL, SAVINGS AND LOAN As-
SOCIATIONS 23-29 (1960); Palmer, Building and Loans and the Own Your Own Home
Movement, REAL EST. FIN., PROC. OF THE MORTGAGE FIN. DIVISION, 17 GEN. SES-
SIONS OF THE NAT'L ASS'N OF REAL EST. BOARDS 33, 33 (1924); RAE, Long Term
Financing by Building and Loan Associations, id. at 28-32. Savings and loan associa-
tions experienced significant growth during the first two decades of the twentieth cen-
tury, H. CLARK & F. CHASE, ELEMENTS OF THE MODERN BUILDING AND LOAN AS-
SOCIATIONS 463-64, 470-72 (1925), and by the 1920's overtook mutual savings banks
as the most common source of capital for residential construction. HISTORICAL STATIS-
TICS, supra note 1, Table N at 262-72; see also Chase, Modernized Building and Loan
Financing, 4 ANNALS OF REAL EST. PRAC. 145, 145-153 (1925); Stern, Value of Build-
ing and Loan Associations to the Realtor, id. at 141, 141-45.
The late nineteenth century also saw the development of mortgage banking com-
panies, which invested in real estate the capital of individuals and institutions such as
life insurance companies. S. KLAMAN, supra at 3-5; R. PEASE & H. CHERRINGTON,
MORTGAGE BANKING 3 (1953). During this period, residential mortgages made up the
largest source of investment for life insurance companies, J. BOYKIN, supra at 88,
which provided an increasingly significant share of construction capital throughout the
period. HISTORICAL STATISTICS supra note 1, Table N at 262-72; see also Cody, Insur-
ance Company Housing Loans, 4 ANNALS OF REAL EST. PRAC. 111-13 (1925); Fraser,
1984]
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Other social and intellectual conditions gave direction to the new form of
development. Traditional American distaste for city living flowered during the
nineteenth century.19 Urban concentration of population, while perhaps neces-
sary for economic reasons, was believed to be unhealthy and morally degrad-
ing.20 Urban congestion was considered a major social evil.21 By contrast,
country living was idealized.22 Suburban life partook of the best of both urban
and rural environments, combining "at once the open air and spaciousness of
the country with the sanitary improvements, comforts and associated life of
the city."' ' 3 In particular, the open space found in the suburbs was praised. An
observer at the time stated of Boston:
What a misery it is that within the peninsula there is not space enough left
for yard room for each house, where children may divert themselves in the
open air, and those of mature years may cultivate flowers . . . now that the
railroads diminish distance, such luxury can be afforded without the smallest
inconvenience, for this makes it unnecessary to crowd buildings together in
the least space.24
Finally, the late nineteenth century saw the emergence of American city
planning, a development that had some influence on the nature of suburban
growth. The era is best remembered for its grand urban designs: Burnham's
plans for Chicago and San Francisco, and the plan of Burnham, Olmstead and
others for Washington, D.C.25 However, some advocates of city planning also
attended to development at the suburban level.2" Planned residential communi-
ties emerged in the United States as early as 1870.27 While speculative un-
Serving Insurance Companies, REAL EST. FIN., PROC. OF THE MORTGAGE FIN. Divi-
SION, 17 GEN. SESSIONS NAT'L Ass'N REAL EST. BOARDS 11, 11-19 (1924); Thorpe,
Insurance Company Investments, Mortgage Loans, id. at 22-23. A final significant in-
stitutional source of construction capital during the period was the commercial bank.
HISTORICAL STATISTICS supra note 1, Table N at 262-72.
19. See S. WARNER, supra note 13, at 11-14, 162.
20. H. GEORGE, SOCIAL PROBLEMS 317 (1934); M. NORDAU, DEGENERATION
35 (2d Gen. ed. N.Y. 1895); A. WEBER, THE GROWTH OF CITIES IN THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY 368 (1899).
21. M. SCOTT, supra note 16, at 84-91.
22. J. BURCHARD & A. BROWN, THE ARCHITECTURE OF AMERICA, A SOCIAL
AND CULTURAL HISTORY 117-21, 133 (1961); S. WARNER, supra note 13, at 11-14,
162.
23. A. WEBER, supra note 20, at 459.
24. T. ADAMS, OUTLINE OF TOWN AND CITY PLANNING 166-67 (1935). For a
later statement of the philosophy of suburb as garden, see J. NICHOLS, REAL ESTATE
SUBDIVISIONS, THE BEST MANNER OF HANDLING THEM 11 (1912).
25. T. ADAMS, supra note 24, at 198-200, 202-07; M. SCOTT, supra note 16, at
47-57, 63-65, 101-09.
26. See, e.g., J. NICHOLS, supra note 24, at 5 (asserting that city planners must
attend to residential development as well as to civic buildings, parkways and
boulevards).
27. Two of the earliest planned residential communities were Riverside, Illinois,
laid out by Frederick Law Olmstead in 1871 and Garden City, Long Island, estab-
lished in 1849. See T. ADAMS, supra note 24, at 176; J. REPS, THE MAKING OF URBAN
700 [Vol. 49
6
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 49, Iss. 4 [1984], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol49/iss4/2
DEFEASIBLE FEE
planned residential subdivision continued throughout the period, the planning
movement contributed to the emergence of ordered and restricted
subdivisions.28
The decentralization of the nation's large urban areas, through the out-
ward spread of residential subdivisions, began as early as the 1850's but be-
came really significant only after 1870. By 1900, ten American cities of more
than 50,000 population had decentralized and by 1930, 51 more had under-
gone this process.2 9 The character of the new residential neighborhoods that
emerged in these decentralized urban areas varied somewhat by location, eco-
nomic status of occupants, and time of construction. By the end of the nine-
teenth century, however, the basic model of residential development was estab-
lished that would continue to the present: detached, single-family housing
segregated from other uses and arranged on uniform blocks fronting on resi-
dential streets, usually laid out in a grid pattern.30
III. LEGAL TOOLS FOR RESTRICTING SUBDIVISIONS
Developers and home buyers desired legal control mechanisms to protect
and preserve this residential environment. A home buyer was often investing
his or her life savings, and was vitally concerned with the protection of this
investment. Moreover, the purchaser bought not only a piece of property, but
also a way of life. Controls were necessary to assure that neighboring lots were
not developed for commercial or, worse yet, industrial uses that would destroy
the homeowner's peaceful enjoyment of his property and diminish the value of
his investment. The purchaser of a suburban lot desired exterior open space
for access to light and air, provision for that great American institution, the
lawn, and room for a garden for relaxation and for a place for the children to
play.3 1 Even if this open space consisted of a pitifully few feet of grass between
AMERICA 344, 345, 348 (1965). Other planned communities designed for the middle
and upper classes followed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century including
Roland Park, Maryland; Radburn, New Jersey; Shaker Heights, Ohio, and Palos
Verdes, California. See T. ADAMS, supra note 24, at 231, 232; G. RADBURN, A PLAN
FOR LIVING (1934). The era also saw the development of housing projects designed by
reformists for workers including Pullman, Illinois and Hopedale, Massachusetts, T.
ADAMS, supra note 24, at 177-179; F. CHOAY, THE MODERN CITY: PLANNING IN THE
19TH CENTURY 29-31 (1969).
28. It also had an immediate effect in the appearance of municipal street plat-
ting commissions in major cities in the early 1890's which largely determined the lay-
out of future subdivisions, M. ScoTT, supra note 16, at 3-5.
29. L. SCHNORE, supra note 15, at 100-04.
30. S. WARNER, supra note 13, at 43, 61, 64, 129-152. There were of course
many variations on this pattern, over time and among neighborhoods occupied by dif-
ferent classes. In particular, lots tended to expand over time, id., at 129, 165, and later
in the period some of the more innovative designers abandoned the grid pattern in favor
of curving and semi-elliptical streets, C. GLAAB & A. BROWN, supra note 13, at 283.
31. See infra notes 203-06 (building setback and open space requirements in
deed restrictions); see also S. WARNER, supra note 13, at 89-91, 136; Nichols, supra
1984]
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the house and the street and a slightly larger space to the rear between the
house and the alley or the rear of an adjacent lot, it was still treasured. Pur-
chasers in the new subdivisions also sought to protect the resale value of their
investment through restrictions that would assure uniformity of building size,
value, and architecture.32
Until 1920, most residential real estate was controlled, if at all, only
through private plat and deed restrictions. 33 Until late in the nineteenth cen-
tury, however, even private law deed restrictions, as we know them today, were
still immature. Though a number of devices for permitting one landowner to
enjoy rights in the property of another had emerged earlier in a variety of
contexts, none of these devices were ideally suited for restricting residential
subdivisions.
The legal restriction needed for creating and preserving residential subdi-
visions had to meet certain specifications. First, it had to be enforceable
against all subsequent purchasers (i.e., the burden of the obligation had to run
with the land). Second, the restriction had to be enforceable not only by the
developer, but also by subsequent purchasers (i.e., the benefit of the obligation
had to run with the land). An initial purchaser could, of course, at the time of
sale, take on obligations to the developer through a contract restricting the
purchaser's development and use of his or her property. This was not ade-
quate, however, since such a contract would not bind future owners of the
restricted parcel or benefit purchasers of neighboring lots. What was needed
was a device that created something more than contractual relationships be-
tween the developer and purchasers. A device was needed that would create
durable property interests mutually enforceable by and against all owners of
lots in the development.
The law as it existed at the outset of our period presented three tools used
in other contexts, each of which met some of these specifications and could be
adapted to the job of restricting property: the defeasible fee, the real covenant,
and the negative easement. By the end of the nineteenth century, a fourth
note 24, at 10-11, 14-15.
32. By the end of the period, building restrictions were heartily embraced by
home buyers. See S. WARNER, supra note 13, at 122; Prather, Planning, Platting and
Improving the Subdivision, 3 ANNALS OF REAL EST. PRAC. 153, 158 (1925); Shuler,
Subdivision Control and Standards, 3 ANNALS OF REAL EST. PRAC. 237, 238 (1925).
Restrictions were also occasionally used by unscrupulous subdividers to trick absentee
buyers into thinking that they were getting high class property. Acts, Recommendation
and Study Relating to Recording, Extinguishment and Modification of Certain Re-
strictions on the Use of Land, 1958 N.Y. L. REvIsION COMM'N REP. 211, 355-56.
33. Control over the development and use of property would, of course, be pro-
vided during the third, post-1920, stage of urban development by public zoning and
subdivision controls. But zoning did not really take hold until the second decade of the
twentieth century. New York, the first major city to adopt zoning, did so in 1916. S.
TOLL, ZONED AMERICAN 164 (1969). The legitimacy of zoning was not finally estab-
lished until Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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device, the equitable servitude,34 emerged as the tool preferred by the courts
for subdivision restriction.3 5
The real covenant36 was, by the nineteenth century, recognized by English
property law in a variety of contexts. Covenants placed in deeds provided se-
curity of title. The earlier law of warranty had been, by this time, replaced by
covenants of warranty, right to convey, seisin, quiet enjoyment, further assur-
ances and against encumbrances. 7 The benefits of these covenants of title at-
tached to and ran with the estate of the covenantee3 8 Covenants that attached
to and ran with the estates of lessors and lessees were also utilized to govern
landlord-tenant relationships.39
For the covenant to be functional in creating restrictions in the residential
subdivision context, however, it was necessary that the burden of the covenant
obligation, as well as the benefit, attach to and run with the land in situations
where privity of estate, in the sense of a landlord-tenant relationship, did not
exist. This possibility was blocked in England where, by the early nineteenth
century, courts had held that the burden of real covenants would not run at
law in the absence of tenurial privity.4 ° This restrictive definition of privity
was early rejected by Judge Hare, the most influential commentator on real
covenants in nineteenth century America, in favor of a broader definition, find-
ing privity between any grantor and grantee of property."1 Most American
courts that considered the issue concurred and permitted the burden of a real
covenant to run whenever there was a grantor-grantee relationship between
the initial covenantee and covenantor.42 Indeed, some courts permitted the
34. The equitable servitude was sometimes called an equitable easement, or,
confusingly and perhaps incorrectly, a negative easement.
35. See Reichman, Toward a Unified Concept of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1177, 1183-1230 (1982) (an excellent recent discussion of the development of
covenants, easements and equitable restrictions in the United States).
36. The real covenant is defined classically as an agreement evidenced by a
sealed and delivered writing and enforceable at law between parties in privity at the
time of the agreement whereby one party agrees to assume an obligation respecting
property. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 214 (1963 ed.); T. PLATT, LAW OF COVE-
NANTS 3 (1829); W. SHEPPARD, TOUCHSTONE *160 (7th ed. 1820).
37. H. RAWLE, COVENANTS OF TITLE 11, 12 (3rd ed. 1860); E. SUGDEN, VEN-
DORS AND PURCHASERS 481, 482 (5th ed. 1818).
38. E. SUGDEN, supra note 37, at 477-481.
39. W. SHEPPARD, supra note 36, at *162, *163; Reno, The Enforcement of
Equitable Servitudes in Land, 28 VA. L. REV. 951, 961 (1942).
40. Keppel v. Bailey, 2 My. & K. 517, 39 Eng. Rep. 1042 (1834); Webb v.
Russell, 3 Tern. Rep. 393, 402, 106 Eng. Rep. 639, 694 (1789); Brewster v. Kitchell,
Holt K.B. 175, 90 Eng. Rep. 995 (1698).
41. Hare, Annotations to Spencer's Case, in J. SMITH, LEADING CASES 108 (1st
Am. ed., 1848), 158-160 (2d American Ed., 1852). Hare based his argument for bas-
ing privity of estate on grantor-grantee relationships in part on an analogy to condi-
tions, which also qualify title and are imposed upon transfer of title. Id.
42. Gilmer v. Mobile & M. Ry., 79 Ala. 569, 58 A. 623 (1885); Hatcher v.
Andrews, 68 Ky. (5 Bush) 561 (1869); Denman v. Prince, 40 Barb. 213 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1862); Wooliscroft v. Norton, 15 Wis. 198 (1862); H. SIMS, REAL COVENANTS 140-73
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burden of covenants to run even in the absence of privity of estate.43 The one
exception to this liberal trend was Massachusetts, which required a mutual
property interest, such as an easement, between the covenantor and covenantee
to establish privity.
4 4
The receptivity of American courts and commentators to the running of
real covenants no doubt contributed to the increasingly frequent use of real
covenant language, by drafters of the period, in creating deed restrictions. By
the early twentieth century, many deeds used the word "covenant," 41 or speci-
fied that restrictions should "run with the land." 46 Rarely, however, did cases
address whether residential deed restrictions were enforceable as covenants at
law.
This was true first, because the most controversial aspects of covenant
doctrine were seldom at issue in the subdivision restriction context. The re-
quirement that restrictions "touch and concern" burdened and benefitted prop-
erty, a much litigated aspect of covenant law, 47 was not an issue because sub-
division restrictions were almost exclusively negative in character, imposing
limitations on the development of the burdened properties. Thus, they clearly
(1901); Lewison, Beneficial and Burdensome Covenants, 15 ALB. L.J. 504, 505-06
(1877). This expansion of privity was criticized by some who supported the conserva-
tive English limitations on the running of covenants. McFee, Privily of Estate, 20 Am.
L. REV. 389, 402-07 (1886). For the modern law on the running of the burdens of
covenants, see 5 R. POWELL, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 673[2][c] n.113 (1981); 2
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.11 (A. Casner ed. 1952); Sims, The Law of Real
Covenants: Exceptions to the Restatement of the Subject by the American Law Insti-
tute, 30 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 20-27 (1944) [hereinafter Sims, Exceptions].
43. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 42, § 9.11 nn.8-l1; 5 R. Pow-
ELL, supra note 42, § 673[2] [c] n.113; Sims, Exceptions, supra note 42, at 32, n.190.
Professor Charles Clark persistently and vociferously claimed that the requirement of
horizontal privity between an initial grantor and grantee for the burden of a real cove-
nant to run was a fabrication of the Restatement. C. CLARK, REAL COVENANTS AND
OTHER INTERESTS WHICH "RUN WITH THE LAND" 116-43 (2d ed. 1947); Clark, Ex-
ceptions to the Restatement of the Law of Real Covenants, 52 YALE L.J. 699, passim
(1943).
44. Morse v. Aldrich, 36 Mass. (19 Pick.) 449 (1837); see Hurd v. Curtis, 36
Mass. (19 Pick.) 459 (1837); Norcross v. James, 140 Mass. 188, 2 N.E. 946 (1885); 2
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 42, § 9.11 n.5; Hamilton, Restrictive Cove-
nants in a Conveyance of Real Estate, 30 ALB. L.J. 4, 6 (1885); Kendrick, Note on
Covenants Running with the Land, 21 CENT. L.J. 457, 459 (1885).
45. See Cook Co. Deeds 8941773 (1925); 9115295 (1928); D.C. Deeds, book
1509 at 491 (1890); book 3327 at 340 (1910).
46. See Cook Co. Deeds 8941773 (1925); 9115295 (1928); D.C. Deeds, book
1509 at 491 (1890).
47. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 42, § 9.13(a). The conservative
approach of some jurisdictions to the touch and concern requirement impeded the use
of covenants in some situations. In particular, restrictions requiring affirmative action
were not enforced as covenants in a number of cases. See, e.g., Glen v. Canby, 24 Md.
127, 130-31 (1865); Norcross v. James, 140 Mass. 188, 190, 2 N.E. 946, 949 (1885);
see also Note, Real Property: Real Covenants: Running of Affirmative Burdens, 19
CORNELL L.Q. 145 (1933).
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touched and concerned affected properties by any definition. The negative na-
ture of most subdivision restrictions also largely obviated consideration of the
issue of privity, which during the nineteenth century came up as a problem
almost exclusively in actions brought to enforce affirmative obligations.48
Second, and more important, the paucity of decisions discussing deed re-
strictions as covenants is attributable to the fact that plaintiffs seeking to en-
force subdivision restrictions normally brought actions for equitable relief. In
these cases, the question of whether restrictions were enforceable at law as
covenants was seldom dispositive. 49 The few cases pronouncing deed restric-
tions to be covenants did so in the context of either saying the restrictions were
not something else50 or as a predicate to enforcing them at equity.51
Another candidate for the job of restricting residential subdivisions was
the negative easement. An easement is an interest in land possessed by another
which entitles the owner of the easement to limited use and enjoyment of the
other's land.52 This interest is protected against interference by third parties
and is capable of creation by conveyance.5 3 It is not subject to the will of the
possessor of the servient property nor a normal incident of the possession of
any other land of the owner of the dominant parcel. 54 One common example of
an easement is a right of way across the land of another. The negative ease-
ment by analogy created negative rights in the land of another. It entitled its
owner to prevent the possessor of the land from using the land in specific ways
otherwise within the possessor's rights.55 A number of early cases interpreting
deed restrictions held that the restrictions created negative easements. 56
By the mid-nineteenth century, an extensive body of easement law existed
in the United States.57 The negative easement was reluctantly acknowledged
by English law, which recognized only four negative easements: the rights to
air, light, support, and water in an artificial stream.58 But negative easements
48. Gilmer v. Mobile & M. Ry., 79 Ala. 569 (1885) (obligation of railroad to
establish flag station); Lyon v. Parker, 45 Me. 474 (1858) (obligation to repair dam);
Wheeler v. Schad, 7 Nev. 204 (1871) (obligation to repair dam).
49. Parker v. Nightingale, 88 Mass. (6 Allen) 341, 344-45 (1863); Barrow v.
Richard, 8 Paige Ch. 35 (N.Y. Ch. 1840); Clark v. Martin, 49 Pa. 289 (1865).
50. For cases interpreting a restriction as a covenant rather than a condition,
see cases cited infra notes 246-47.
51. See cases cited infra note 69.
52. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 450 (1944).
53. Id. § 450(b), (e).
54. Id. § 450(c), (d).
55. Id. § 452.
56. Trustees of Columbia College v. Lynch, 70 N.Y. 440 (1877); Barrow v.
Richard, 8 Paige Ch. 35 (N.Y. Ch. 1840); Muzzarelli v. Hulshizer, 163 Pa. 643, 30 A.
291 (1894).
57. The first edition of E. WASHBURN, A TREATISE ON THE AMERICAN LAW OF
EASEMENTS AND SERVITUDES (1863), came to well over 600 pages. A second edition
was issued four years later.
58. Reichman, supra note 35, at 1187 n.42; C. GALE, THE LAW OF EASEMENTS
21 (4th ed. 1868).
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came to be used expansively in the United States, not only for protecting light
and air, 9 but also for enforcing setback lines60 and limiting noxious uses.61
The easement was superior to the covenant as a restrictive tool because it was
not subject to a requirement of privity.62 As deed restrictions became more
complex and extended beyond establishing setback lines and limiting nui-
sances, however, they bore less resemblance to traditional easements and
seemed increasingly fictive. Some American courts were hesitant to recognize
negative easements for purposes not known to the common law.63 Moreover,
while restrictions treated as easements were commonly enforced at equity,
some courts expressed doubt whether they were enforceable at law.64 This sug-
gests that such "equitable easements" were not in fact true easements.05 Per-
haps because of these uncertainties, drafters of subdivision restrictions were
less enamored with easement theory than were the courts. None of the deeds
surveyed by the author denominated use restrictions as easements.
As actions for injunctions to enforce subdivision deed restrictions became
more common, it became increasingly clear that courts were not particularly
concerned with the legal classification of restrictions, only with whether the
restrictions ought to be enforced at equity. Thus, a fourth kind of restriction
enforceable at equity, variously called an equitable servitude, equitable ease-
ment, or sometimes an (equitable) negative easement, came to the fore as the
primary tool the courts recognized for enforcing subdivision restrictions.
Though this development is commonly traced to the English case of Tulk v.
Moxhay,66 American cases enforcing restrictions at equity antedate Tulk. 7
The theories courts put forward for equitable enforcement of restrictions va-
ried widely.68 Some courts believed that they were enforcing covenants at eq-
59. See E. WASHBURN, A TREATISE ON THE AMERICAN LAW OF EASEMENTS
AND SERVITUDES 648-72 (4th ed. 1885).
60. Muzzarelli v. Hulshizer, 163 Pa. 643, 30 A. 291 (1894).
61. Whitney v. Union Ry., 77 Mass. (11 Gray) 359 (1858); Barrow v. Richard,
8 Paige Ch. 351 (N.Y. Ch. 1840).
62. Whitney v. Union Ry., 77 Mass. (11 Gray) 359, 363-66 (1858); Halle v.
Newbold, 69 Md. 265, 270-72, 14 A. 662, 663-64 (1888); Trustees of Columbia Col-
lege v. Lynch, 70 N.Y. 441, 448-49 (1877).
63. Werner v. Graham, 181 Cal. 174, 180-81, 183 P. 945, 947 (1919); Brewer
v. Marshall, 19 N.J. Eq. 537, 545 (N.J. 1868); Eckert v. Peters, 55 N.J. Eq. 379, 386,
36 A. 491, 493 (N.J. Ch. 1897); DeGray v. Monmouth Beach Clubhouse Co., 50 N.J.
Eq. 329, 339, 24 A. 388, 391 (N.J. Ch. 1892); Tardy v. Creasy, 81 Va. 553, 557-58
(1886).
64. Barrow v. Richard, 8 Paige Ch. 351 (N.Y. Ch. 1840) (limiting noxious
uses); see DePue, Equitable Easements, 29 AM. L. REG. 73, 75 (1890).
65. See Giddings, Restrictions Upon the Use of Land, 5 HARV. L. REV. 274,
276-277 (1892) (arguing that such restrictions were distinct equitable rights analogous
to but distinguishable from easements).
66. 2 Phil. Ch. 774 (1848).
67. Barrow v. Richard, 8 Paige Ch. 351 (N.Y. Ch. 1840); Hills v. Miller, 3
Paige Ch. 254 (N.Y. Ch. 1832).
68. Kratovil, Building Restrictions-Contracts or Servitudes, 11 J. MAR. J.
PRAC. & PROC. 465 (1978); Reno, supra note 39, at 972-79.
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uity,69 others that they were specifically enforcing negative easements,7 0 still
others that they were simply enforcing a promise against successors to a prom-
isor with notice of the promise.7 1 Theory was a good deal less important to the
courts than were the equities of the situation being litigated. The primary con-
cern of the courts was identifying the obligor and beneficiary of a duty re-
specting a parcel of land.
7 2
The willingness of the courts to enforce virtually any form of restriction
at equity made relatively unimportant the form of restriction drafters used.
Nevertheless, drafters of subdivision deed restrictions generally attempted to
use recognized legal devices. Most commonly, they used either covenant or
condition rather than easement or equitable servitude language.7 3 This may be
attributable to the relatively slow recognition and exploration of equitable ser-
vitudes in the cases1 4 and commentary," caution and fear of innovation on the
69. Robbins v. Webb, 68 Ala. 393, 399 (1880); Brower v. Jones, 23 Barb. 153,
162 (N.Y. App. Div. 1856); see Ludwig v. St. Andrews Lutheran Church, 67 Pa. 512,
518 (1871); Note, Real Property-Distinction Between Covenants Running with the
Land and Restrictive Covenants, 14 VA. L. REV. 646, 647-52 (1928).
70. McMahon v. Williams, 79 Ala. 288, 290 (1885); Webb v. Robbins, 77 Ala.
176, 183 (1884); Peck v. Conway, 119 Mass. 546, 549 (1876); Trustees of Columbia
College v. Lynch, 70 N.Y. 440, 446-48 (1877); Barrow v. Richard, 8 Paige Ch. 351,
359 (N.Y. Ch. 1840); Hills v. Miller, 3 Paige Ch. 254, 256-57 (N.Y. Ch. 1832).
71. Whitney v. Union Ry., 77 Mass. (11 Gray) 359, 366 (1858); DeGray v.
Monmouth Beach Clubhouse Co., 50 N.J. Eq. 329, 339, 24 A. 388, 391 (N.J. Ch.
1892); Kirkpatrick v. Peshine, 24 N.J. Eq. 206, 213 (N.J. Ch. 1873); Tallmadge v.
East River Bank, 26 N.Y. 105, 109-12 (1862); Clark v. Martin, 49 Pa. 289, 297
(1865); Ames, Specific Performance For and Against Strangers to the Contract, 17
HARV. L. REV. 174, 183 (1904); Keasbey, Restrictions Upon the Use of Land, 6
HARV. L. REV. 280, 289-90, 300 (1893). Giddings argued that equitable restrictions
were enforceable under constructive trust doctrine. See Giddings, supra note 65, at
275.
72. Parker v. Nightingale, 88 Mass. (6 Allen) 341, 347-48 (1863).
73. Cook Co. Deeds, 1489440 (1891); 1413985 (1890); 1905357 (1893);
2141489 (1891); 2101593 (1890) use "express condition"; "expressly covenanted" is
used in 1381537 (1890) and 1543991 (1891).
74. Though cases granting injunctions to enforce building restrictions appear
quite early on the eastern seaboard, see, e.g., Thruston v. Minke, 32 Md. 487 (1870);
Parker v. Nightingale, 88 Mass. (6 Allen) 341 (1863); Whitney v. Union Ry. Co., 77
Mass. (11 Gray) 359 (1858); Hills v. Miller, 3 Paige Ch. 254 (N.Y. Ch. 1832); Lud-
wig v. St. Andrews Church, 67 Pa. 512 (1871); Clark v. Martin, 49 Pa. 289 (1865), as
a rule they are not found further west until somewhat later, see, e.g., Frye v. Partridge,
82 Ill. 267 (1876); Watrous v. Allen, 57 Mich. 362, 24 N.W. 104 (1885); Anderson v.
Rowland, 18 Tex. Civ. App. 460, 44 S.W. 911 (1898); Boyden v. Roberts, 131 Wis.
659, 111 N.W. 701 (1907); Swietlik, Law of Restrictions on Land in Wisconsin, 41
MARQ. L. REV. 227 (1957). As late as 1892, Giddings claimed that the law of equita-
ble servitudes was still in its infancy, with the cases largely confined to New York,
Massachusetts and England, and even in those jurisdictions many questions remained
unanswered. Giddings, supra note 65, at 284.
75. Though Tulk v. Moxhay was noted within a decade by one American com-
mentator, see 2 J. STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 737 (6th ed. 1853); cf. id. § 926a
(discussing equitable enforcement of deed restrictions), recognition of equitable en-
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part of the drafters, or a desire by drafters for remedial options other than the
injunction, i.e., damages or forfeiture. Avoidance of equitable servitudes in a
few situations may also have been due to the reluctance of some American
jurisdictions to enforce affirmative obligations through equitable servitudes."0
IV. THE DEFEASIBLE FEE AS A LAND USE PLANNING TOOL
While the law of real covenants, negative easements, and equitable servi-
tudes was still in a formative stage until late in the nineteenth century, the
drafter of deed restrictions of that period had ready access to an elaborate law
of defeasible fees developed in closely related contexts, such as charitable or
public donations,"7 industrial development,"8 family settlements,7 1 and support
arrangements."0 It was natural for many developers to turn first to this budy of
law for models for drafting residential subdivision restrictions."1 It is not sur-
forcement of deed restrictions did not become common in the generally cited treatises
of the period until much later. The subject was first discussed in the 12th (1873) edi-
tion of 4 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 1480, and in the 5th (1877)
edition of 2 E. WASHBURN, REAL PROPERTY 299 n.1. The first treatise devoting exten-
sive attention to equitable servitudes appeared in 1901. See H. Sims, supra note 42, at
231-61. The first law review article on the subject appeared in 1890. See DePue, supra
note 64.
76. See, e.g., Miller v. Clary, 210 N.Y. 127, 103 N.E. 1114 (1913). Developers
did not limit themselves to the vocabulary of legal control devices commonly recognized
at the time, but also tried a number of idiosyncratic devices. Late in the period, some
deed restrictions were written with penalty clauses. A breach of the restriction would
entitle the developer to collect a penalty for each day of continuance of the breach
from the violator. See deed restrictions for Sudbrook, Baltimore County, Md. devel-
oped by the Olmstead firm in 1889 in Land Subdivision Restrictions, 16 LANDSCAPE
ARCHITECTURE 53 (1926). A more common clause entitled the developer to enter and
correct the violation at the violator's expense without liability for trespass, a restriction
based on analogies to self help nuisance abatement. See I. ABBOTT, CLERKS AND CON-
VEYANCER's ASSISTANT 341-43 (1887). This device was used extensively by the Olm-
stead firm. Id.; see also Linzee v. Mixer, 101 Mass. 512, 517 (1869) (where this device
was used in a deed from the Commonwealth); Suffolk Co. Deeds, book 3519, at 327
(1910). These devices enjoyed only limited use throughout the period, probably because
of enforcement difficulties. See H. MONCHOW, THE USE OF DEED RESTRICTIONS IN
SUBDIVISION DEVELOPMENT 64-65 (1928).
77. Warner v. Bennett, 31 Conn. 468 (1863); Dolan v. City of Baltimore, 4
Gill. 394 (Md. 1846); Stuyvesant v. City of N.Y., 11 Paige Ch. 414 (N.Y. Ch. 1845).
78. Underhill v. Saratoga & W. R.R., 20 Barb. 455 (N.Y. 1855).
79. Buckmaster v. Needham, 22 Vt. 617 (1850).
80. Spaulding v. Hallenbeck, 39 Barb. 79 (N.Y. 1862); see also Bordwell, The
Common Law Scheme of Estates, 18 IowA L. REV. 425, 441 (1933) (use of condi-
tional estates dates from 1250); Brake, Fee Simple Defeasible: The Purposes They
Serve with an Appraisal of Their Utility, 28 Ky. L.J. 424 (1940) (discussing various
uses of defeasible fees).
81. See Fratcher, Defeasance as a Restrictive Device in Michigan, 52 MICH. L.
REV. 505, 517 (1954); see also Note, Possibility of Reverter in Iowa: A Feature of a
Fee Simple Determinable, 30 IOWA L. REV. 81, 83-84 (1944) (attributing the popular-
ity of the device in the United States to Blackstone's recognition of the fee simple
14
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prising, therefore, that use of defeasible fees for deed restrictions was wide-
spread during the period from 1870 until 1920, appearing before other forms
of restriction in many jurisdictions and becoming nearly universal in some
areas.
For the benefit of those whose memory of first year property is now fuzzy,
a quick review of the lore of defeasible fees is in order. The 1936 Restatement
of Property distinguished three kinds of defeasible fees: the fee simple deter-
minable-created by any limitation that establishes an estate in fee simple and
provides that the estate shall automatically expire upon the occurrence of a
stated event;82 the fee simple subject to a condition subsequent--created by
any condition that establishes an estate in fee simple and provides that upon
the occurrence of a stated event the grantor or his successor shall have the
power to terminate the estate;83 and the fee simple subject to an executory
limitation, which establishes an estate in fee simple in a grantee but provides
that upon the occurrence of a stated event the grantee will be divested in favor
of another transferee other than the grantor or his successor.84 A fee simple
determinable would be created by a grant for so long as the property were
used for residential purposes. A grant in fee, but subject to the condition that
if the property were ever to be used for other than residential purposes, the
grantor or his heirs could re-enter and take possession, would create a fee
simple subject to a condition subsequent. Finally, a grant for so long as the
property were used for residential purposes, but stipulating that if the property
were ever used for other than residential purposes it would pass to a third
party other than the grantor or grantee, would create a fee simple subject to
an executory limitation. In each instance, the grant of a defeasible fee would
create a future interest. The future interests that correspond to the three de-
feasible estates are: the possibility of reverter,85 the power of termination 8 (or
right of reentry), and the executory interest.87 The Restatement's classification
of these three categories of defeasible fees is more or less in line with other
modern sources,8 8 and on the whole consistent with the distinctions generally
determinable).
82. 1 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 44 (1936).
83. Id. §45.
84. Id. §46.
85. 2 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 154 (1936).
86. Id. § 155.
87. Id. § 158.
88. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 42, §§ 2.6-2.11; T. BERGIN &
P. HASKELL, PREFACE TO ESTATES IN LAND AND FUTURE INTERESTS 48-58, 64-68
(1966); J. CRIBBET, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 42-45 (2d ed. 1975); R.
POWELL, supra note 42, §§ 178, 179, 187-190; 1 L. SIMES & A. SMITH, THE LAW OF
FUTURE INTERESTS §§ 228, 241-65, 281-94 (2d ed. 1956); Bowman, Defeasance of
Estates on Condition, 27 YALE L.J. 619, 622-23 (1918); Goldstein, Rights of Entry
and Possibilities of Reverter as Devices to Restrict the Use of Land, 54 HARV. L. REV.
248, 271-75 (1940); McCall, Estates on Condition in North Carolina, 19 N.C.L. REV.
334, 334-35 (1941); Note, Possibilities of Reverter and Powers of Termination in
Michigan, 37 DET. C.L. REV. 284, 284-86 (1959); see also Powell, Determinable Fees,
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recognized by authorities in the nineteenth century. 89
These distinctions were of little practical importance to the drafters of
deed restrictions in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries or to the
courts interpreting those restrictions." The fee simple subject to executory
limitation was not commonly used for deed restrictions. Though this type of
defeasible fee could, in theory, have been used to transfer the responsibility of
enforcement of restrictions from developers to neighbors or neighborhood as-
sociations who could have been granted the executory interest, the author dis-
covered no examples of this kind of grant. This paucity of fees subject to exec-
utory limitation is no doubt attributable to the fact that these interests were
subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities,91 and thus avoided by drafters who
feared the many hazards of that Rule.
23 COLUM. L. REV. 207, 207-08 (1923) [hereinafter cited as Determinable Fees] (dis-
tinguishing determinable fees, fee simple conditional, base fee); Walsh, Conditional
Estates and Covenants Running With the Land, 14 N.Y.U. L. REv. 162, 162 (1937)
(no relationship between current fee simple subject to condition subsequent and condi-
tional fee of thirteenth century).
89. Though the nineteenth and early twentieth century commentators accepted
these distinctions, they used somewhat different terms to refer to the estates. Challis
distinguished determinable limitations and limitations upon condition along the lines of
the Restatement. H. CHALLIS, REAL PROPERTY 189-90 (1891). Washburn made a sim-
ilar distinction between "conditional limitations" and "estates on condition." 2 E.
WASHBURN, supra note 75, at *457-58. Kent distinguished qualified or determinable
fees (which terms he used interchangeably) and fees on condition. 4 J. KENT, COMMEN-
TARIES *9-11, *122-33 (Lacy ed. 1889). Sheppard distinguished conditions, which de-
feat estates, and limitations, which determine or suspend vesting. W. SHEPPARD, supra
note 36, at 117. Blackstone distinguished base or qualified fees-the equivalent of the
fee simple determinable-and conditional fees, transformed by de Donis into fees tail.
2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 109, 110 (Chitty's ed. 1872). He also recognized es-
tates on condition, the equivalent of the fee subject to a condition subsequent, id. at
152, and distinguished estates on condition from estates on limitation, id. at 155.
Tiffany called determinable estates "estates on special limitation." H. TIFFANY,
REAL PROPERTY 331-37 (2d ed. 1920). Tiffany also noted that determinable estates
had been called by others base fees or qualified fees. Id. at 334 n.72. He properly
noted, however, that the term "base fee" was more correctly applied "to the estate
which arises in the grantee of a tenant in tail upon the barring of the issue in tail by
any act which is ineffectual to bar the reversion expectant on the estate tail." Id.;
accord Powell, Determinable Fees, supra note 88, at 207-08. He also noted that the
term "qualified" fee was properly applied to an estate limited to a grantee and certain
of his heirs only, as a fee tail male. Id. Preston followed a similar distinction between
determinable fees, conditional fees, and qualified fees, see R. PRESTON, ESTATES 431,
449, 475 (1820), as did Zane, see Zane, Determinable Fees in American Jurisdictions,
17 HARV. L. REV. 297, 297-98 (1904) (distinguishing determinable fees, fees subject to
conditional limitation, and base fees), and Challis. Challis, Determinable Fees, 3 L.Q.
REV. 403, 404-05 (1887) (arguing that a separate category for qualified fees is useful).
But see Gray, Defeasible Fees, 3 L.Q. REV. 399, 399, n.1 (1887) (insisting that there is
no distinction between qualified, determinable and base fees).
90. See infra notes 91-109 and accompanying text.
91. See Brattle St. Church v. Grant, 19 Mass. (3 Gray) 142, 148-49 (1855); 2
E. WASHBURN, supra note 75, at 461.
[Vol. 49
16
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 49, Iss. 4 [1984], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol49/iss4/2
19841 DEFEASIBLE FEE
Restrictions written using conditional or durational language varied
widely, but sometimes fell into basic patterns not easily identified with the
Restatement categories. Many of the deeds stated merely that the grant was
"subject to condition,"9 2 or on "express condition," 93 with no express reversion
or reentry clauses. Courts tended to treat such language as establishing cove-
nants rather than as creating a conditional or determinable fee. 94 Occasionally,
however, a court would interpret it as creating a conditional fee.
9 5
More common were deeds expressly stipulating that breaches of condi-
tions would cause the property to "revert to the grantor" 9 or "work forfeiture
of the estate, '97 or cause the deed of conveyance to be void,9  or some combi-
nation of these terms.99 Though these terms seemed to contemplate automatic
reversion, a characteristic of determinable fees, the courts generally inter-
92. Cassidy v. Mason, 171 Mass. 507, 507, 50 N.E. 1027, 1028 (1898); Skinner
v. Shepard, 130 Mass. 180, 180 (1881); Pank v. Eaton, 115 Mo. App. 171, 174, 89
S.W. 586, 586 (1905); Cook Co. Deed 4111069 (1907).
93. Clapp v. Wilder, 176 Mass. 332, 333, 57 N.E. 692, 692 (1900); Post v.
Weil, 115 N.Y. 361, 368, 22 N.E. 145, 146 (1889); D.C. Deed 4364-222 (1920); Cook
Co. Deed 8941773 (1925).
94. Cassidy v. Mason, 171 Mass. 507, 50 N.E. 1027 (1898); Skinner v. Shep-
ard, 130 Mass. 180 (1881); Pank v. Eaton, 115 Mo. App. 171, 89 S.W. 586 (1905);
Post v. Weil, 115 N.Y. 361, 22 N.E. 145 (1889).
95. Clapp v. Wilder, 176 Mass. 332, 57 N.E. 692 (1900).
96. Cornbleth v. Allen, 80 Cal. App. 459, 251 P. 87 (1926); Fusha v. Dacono
Townsite Co., 60 Colo. 315, 153 P. 226 (1915); Hoskins v. Walker, 255 S.W.2d 480
(Ky. 1953); Koehler v. Rowland, 275 Mo. 573, 205 S.W. 217 (1918); Carruthers v.
Spaulding, 242 A.D. 412, 275 N.Y.S. 530 (1934); Schulman v. Ellenville Elec. Co.,
152 Misc. 843, 273 N.Y.S. 37 (1934); Pence v. Tidewater Townsite Co., 127 Va. 447,
103 S.E. 694 (1920); D.C. Deeds, book 4354 at 270 (1920).
97. Duester v. Alvin, 74 Or. 544, 547, 145 P. 660, 661 (1915); O'Brien v. Wag-
ner, 94 Mo. 93, 96, 7 S.W. 19, 19 (1888) ("under penalty of forfeiture"); see also
Richter v. Distelhurst, 116 A.D. 269, 271, 101 N.Y.S. 634, 635 (1906) ("under pen-
alty of forfeiture").
98. Brown v. Wrightman, 5 Cal. App. 391, 90 P. 467 (1907); Collins Mfg. Co.
v. Marcy, 25 Conn. 241, 242 (1856).
99. O'Malley v. Central Methodist Church, 67 Ariz. 245, 248-49, 194 P.2d
444, 447 (1948) ("premises shall become forfeited and revert"); Los Angeles & Ariz.
Land Co. v. Marr, 187 Cal. 126, 128, 200 P. 1051, 1052 (1921) ("In the event of
violation . . . instrument shall become null and void, the grantee herein shall forfeit all
right or title to said property and all interest therein shall revert without notice to the
grantor herein"); Firth v. Marovich, 160 Cal. 257, 258, 116 P. 729, 730 (1911) ("shall
have the effect of forfeiting the title . . . and . . . title . . . shall revert"); Storke v.
Penn Mut. Life Ins., 390 Ill. 619, 621, 61 N.E.2d 552, 553 (1945) ("premises shall
immediately revert . . . and the said party of the second part shall forfeit all right,
title, and interest"); Hopkins v. Smith, 162 Mass. 444, 38 N.E. 1122, 1122 (1894)
("work a forfeiture of the estate hereby conveyed and reinvest the same in the gran-
tor"); Jones v. McLain, 16 Tex. Civ. App. 305, 305-06, 41 S.W. 714, 714 (1897)
("deed . . . shall be null and void. . . and. . . premises. . . shall forthwith revert");
Cook Co. Deed 8941773 (1925) ("deed shall . . . become null and void and the prop-
erty . . . shall forewith revert"); Franklin Co. Deeds, book 502, at 556 (1911) ("inter-
est . . . shall immediately be forfeited and revert . . . to grantor").
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preted them as creating fees subject to condition subsequent rather than deter-
minable fees. 1'0 Occasionally, courts interpreted these terms as creating cove-
nants,101 or described them by hybrid terms such as "conditional estate in the
nature of a negative easement"' 0 2 or "right of reverter.' 0 3 A few courts stated
that such language created a possibility of reverter, though exhibiting no
awareness that the possibility of reverter was distinguishable from the right of
entry. 04
Finally, the most complex deeds contained both reverter and reentry
clauses, stating, for example, that upon violation the "indenture shall be void
and the said premises shall revert to and become the absolute property of the
said party of the first part, their heirs and assigns, who may enter into posses-
sion thereof."'1 5 These clauses were uniformly treated as creating conditions
subsequent."' Only one of the cases reviewed by the author in which condi-
tional restrictions were used for land use planning contained an extended dis-
cussion of the distinction between fees subject to condition subsequent and fees
simple determinable. 0 7 That case concluded that the grant at issue was condi-
tional rather than determinable, but, in fact, the distinction made no differ-
ence in the result in the case-denial of forfeiture.10 8 In sum, whatever useful-
ness the traditional distinctions between fees subject to conditions subsequent
and determinable fees may have in other areas, 10 they have played no role in
the development of the defeasible fee for land use planning, and will thus be
100. See, e.g., Firth v. Marovich, 160 Cal. 257, 116 P. 729 (1911); Hoskins v.
Walker, 255 S.W.2d 480, 481 (Ky. 1953); Schulman v. Ellenville Elec. Co., 152 Misc.
843, 844, 273 N.Y.S. 530, 531 (1934); Koehler v. Rowland, 275 Mo. 573, 584, 205
S.W. 217, 220 (1918); Duester v. Alvin, 74 Or. 544, 551-52, 145 P. 660, 663 (1915).
101. Carruthers v. Spaulding, 242 A.D. 412, 416, 275 N.Y.S. 37, 39 (1934).
102. Duester v. Alvin, 74 Or. 544, 552, 145 P. 660, 663 (1915).
103. Clapp v. Wilder, 176 Mass. 332, 337, 57 N.E. 692, 693 (1900).
104. Hoskins v. Walker, 255 S.W.2d 480, 482 (Ky. 1953).
105. Plumb v. Tubbs, 41 N.Y. 442, 443 (1869); accord Hartwig v. Grace Hosp.,
198 Mich. 725, 726, 165 N.W. 827, 827 (1917); Kingston v. Busch, 176 Mich. 566,
567, 142 N.W. 754, 754 (1913); see also Watrous v. Allen, 57 Mich. 362, 364, 24
N.W. 104, 105 (1885); Franklin Co. Deeds, book 218, at 510 (1890); id. book 500, at
167 (1910).
106. See cases cited supra note 105.
107. - Storke v. Penn Mut. Life Ins., 390 Ill. 619, 61 N.E.2d 552 (1945).
108. Id. at 626-28; 61 N.E.2d 552, 557.
109. Compare Hammond, Limitations of Possibility of Reverter and Rights of
Entry, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH CENTER, CURRENT TRENDS
IN STATE LEGISLATION, 1953-1954, at 597, 598 (1955); Browder, Defeasible Fee Es-
tates in Oklahoma, the Civic Center Cases, 4 OKLA. L. REV. 141, 143 (1951) (deplor-
ing continued distinctions between estates); Dunham, Possibility of Reverter and
Power of Termination-Fraternal or Identical Twins, 20 U. CHI. L. REV. 215 (1953);
Waggoner, Reformulating the Structure of Estates: A Proposal for Legislative Action,
85 HARV. L. REV. 729, 740 (1972); and Comment, Equivalence of Right of Entry and
Right of Reverter, 18 OHIO ST. L.J. 120 (1957) (demonstrating triviality of modern
distinctions between defeasible fee estates); with Walsh, supra note 88, at 187-89
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largely ignored through the remainder of this article. Defeasible fee deed re-
strictions will be referred to as conditions, in line with the practice of the
courts, even though in a few instances they technically created determinable
estates.
The defeasible fee differs dramatically from the other forms of restric-
tions in its remedy. Violation of one of the other forms of restrictions renders
the violator liable for damages or injunctive relief. There is necessarily some
relationship between the seriousness of the breach and the penalty, if any,
imposed. Violation of a restriction imposed by the grant of a defeasible fee
results, at least in theory, in forfeiture, 10 a remedy that bears no necessary
relationship to the nature of the breach, and that is, in fact, in most instances
inappropriately draconian.
Undoubtedly, many developers and their attorneys turned to the defeasi-
ble fee as a tool for restricting subdivisions because of the common use of
conditions for restricting the use of property in other contexts.' 1' However, it
must have seemed, at the time, a propitious choice. First, restriction of a sub-
division through uniform conditional deeds appeared to offer substantial pro-
tection to purchasers of subdivision lots. The threat of forfeiture impressed the
legally unsophisticated purchaser of a lot worried about the enforceability of
deed restrictions." 2 The purchaser to whom the defeasible deed restriction was
touted no doubt believed that if a neighbor built a slaughterhouse or a bay
window projecting beyond the setback line the neighbor's property would re-
vert to the developer. Forfeiture appeared on its face a much more effective
deterrent than the threat of a damage suit. Moreover, conditional restrictions
enforced by forfeiture clearly ran with the land to bind future purchasers." 3 A
purchaser of land in a development did not have to worry that the burden of
restrictions might be lifted once its lots began to change hands.
The defeasible fee also met the needs of the developer." 4 Indeed, it
yielded benefits not accessible through other forms of deed restrictions. The
law was relatively clear that, in theory, restrictions applied through defeasible
110. But see cases cited notes 248-49 infra (neighbors permitted to enforce con-
ditions as equitable servitudes).
111. See supra text accompanying notes 77-81.
112. See Denissen, Illinois Reverter Act, 36 ILL. B.J. 263, 263 (1948); Note,
Distinction Between "Covenant" and "Conditions Subsequent" as Restraints Against
Alienation, 21 NOTRE DAME LAW. 208, 209 (1948).
113. Odessa Improvement & Irrigation Co. v. Dawson, 5 Tex. Civ. App. 487,
490, 24 S.W. 576, 577 (1893); Graves, Estates on Condition, 5 VA. L. REV. 373, 396-
97 (1918).
114. Developers during the period were well aware that lots protected by restric-
tions were worth more and easier to sell than lots without protection. Nichols, Subur-
ban Subdivisions with Community Features, HOMEBUILDING AND SUBDIVIDING, PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE HOMEBUILDERS AND SUBDIVIDERS DIVISION, 17 GEN. SESSIONS
NAT'L ASS'N REAL EST. BOARDS 10, 16-18 (1924); Taylor, Districting Through Private
Effort, 8 NAT'L CONF. ON CITY PLANNING 177, 178 (1916).
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estates could exist in gross;" 5 therefore the power to enforce the restrictions
could be held by a developer even though that developer did not retain any
other property in the development. This was not clearly true with equitable
servitudes" 6 or real covenants."17 Further, the use of defeasible fees appeared
to allow the developer to market a subdivision at a premium as a restricted
community without really limiting options for future development. Where the
developer imposed a restriction through an equitable servitude contained in a
deed to a purchaser in a subdivision, and the purchaser believed that the servi-
tude would be imposed throughout the development as part of a common
scheme, the developer might be obligated to include such a restriction in all
future deeds in the development. 1 ' The defeasible fee was more clearly a one
way device. Technically, the developer who granted the defeasible fee retained
an estate or a power, but was not in any way limited as to the development of
other properties. If the development sold poorly, the developer could, without
apparent liability, change the layout or even sell lots for commercial develop-
ment." 9 Further, the defeasible fee was well adapted for developers who re-
tained property for themselves within the development or who felt strongly
enough about some issues, such as the sale of alcohol or race restrictions, to
desire continued control over the development even after their last lots had
been sold."' This control could be retained more effectively through defeasible
fee restrictions than through alternative restrictive devices. 21 Finally, some
developers may have desired the gambler's chance of actually recovering prop-
erty for resale if a condition was breached or the potential for future profit by
sale of releases. 2
The precise route through which developers and their attorneys latched
onto the defeasible fee as a viable device for private land use planning is hard
to trace. Though, of course, the property and conveyancing treatises of the
nineteenth century describe the defeasible fee, they did so primarily in the
115. Cornbleth v. Allen, 80 Cal. App. 459, 463, 251 P. 87, 88 (1926); Gray v.
Blanchard, 25 Mass. (8 Pick.) 284, 290 (1829); Riverton Country Club v. Thomas, 141
N.J. Eq. 435, 443, 58 A.2d 89, 95 (1948).
116. Los Angeles Univ. v. Swarth, 107 F. 798, 804-06 (9th Cir. 1901); Forman
v. Sadler's Ex'rs, 114 Md. 574, 579, 80 A. 298, 300 (1911). Contra Van Sant v. Rose,
260 Ill. 401, 103 N.E. 194 (1913). See generally C. CLARK, supra note 43, at 181-83
(discussing authorities on both sides of this question).
117. Orenberg v. Horan, 269 Mass. 312, 315-16, 168 N.E. 794, 795 (1929);
Wilmurt v. McGrane, 16 A.D. 412, 416, 45 N.Y. Supp. 32, 34 (1897); ef. C. CLARK,
supra note 43, at 106-11 (discussing authorities taking both sides of this question).
118. See Stone, The Equitable Rights and Liabilities of Strangers to a Con-
tract, 19 COLUM. L. Rnv. 177, 187 (1919).
119. See S. WARNER, supra note 13, at 78, 79; Nichols, A Developer's View of
Deed Restrictions, 5 J. LAND & PUBLIC UTILITIEs EcON. 132, 132 (1929).
120. See, e.g., Plumb v. Tubbs, 41 N.Y. 442 (1869); Gilbert v. Peteler, 38 N.Y.
165, 166 (1868).
121. See supra notes 115-17.
122. See authorities cited infra note 260.
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context of charitable donations and family settlements. 2 3 Legal formbooks of
this period, another obvious source for drafters, generally set out building re-
strictions in covenant rather than conditional form.2 4 Because the forms of
deed restrictions varied markedly from locality to locality, this question is best
addressed on a more local scale.
V. LOCAL VARIATIONS IN THE USE OF THE DEFEASIBLE FEE FOR DEED
RESTRICTIONS
The prevalence of the use of the defeasible fee for land use planning va-
ried widely both geographically and chronologically. Not surprisingly, the ear-
liest cases involving defeasible fees for land use control appear on the eastern
seaboard. By 1870, cases involving deeds containing land use conditions had
been decided in Connecticut," 5 New York,"02 Pennsylvania, 1 7 Maryland, 12
and New Hampshire." 9 Reliance on the defeasible fee for land use planning in
many of these jurisdictions was, however, short-lived. In particular, the courts
of New York, 130 New Jersey, 131 Massachusetts,' 3' and Pennsylvania 33 began
123. See 2 R. DEVLIN, DEEDS §§ 958-91 (1st ed. 1887); 4 J. KENT, supra note
89, at *122-33; 2 E. WASHBURN, supra note 75, at *445-61. But see R. DEVLIN, supra
§§ 963, 968 (discussing conditions against the sale of intoxicating liquors and the use
of buildings for certain purposes); I. SHARSWOOD & H. BUDD, LEADING CASES IN THE
LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 134-35 (1883) (discussing conditions limiting use of land).
124. I. ABBOTT, CLERKS AND CONVEYANCERS ASSISTANT 300-01 (2d ed. 1867);
S. GORDON, ANNOTATED REAL ESTATE FORMS 347-53 (1929); L. JONES, FORMS IN
CONVEYANCING 255-57 (1886); T. O'MALLEY, FORMS IN COMMON USE 164-65 (1916);
G. THOMPSON, ANNOTATED FORMS COVERING THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
437-39 (1924); F. TIFFANY, LEGAL AND BUSINESS FORMS 498-500 (1915). A few form
books offered restrictive clauses under a heading "Restrictions or Conditions" though
these clauses were not set out in conditional language. G. THOMPSON, supra at 441-42;
F. TIFFANY, supra at 501-02.
125. Collins Mfg. Co. v. Marcy, 25 Conn. 242 (1856) (condition prohibiting sale
of alcohol).
126. Plumb v. Tubbs, 41 N.Y. 442 (1869) (condition prohibiting sale or manu-
facture of alcohol).
127. Clark v. Martin, 49 Pa. St. 289 (1865) (condition requiring use for residen-
tial buildings and outbuilding on location of residence).
128. House's Lessee v. Beatty, 3 H. & McH. 182 (Md. 1794) (condition requir-
ing prompt construction of house).
129. Gillis v. Bailey, 21 N.H. 149 (1850) (condition requiring use for a single
dwelling house).
130. See Post v. Weil, 115 N.Y. 361, 22 N.E. 145 (1889) (conditional language
created a covenant which was subsequently extinguished and thus did not impair mar-
ketability of title).
131. Roberts v. Scull, 58 N.J. Eq. 396, 43 A. 583 (1899).
132. See Cassidy v. Mason, 171 Mass. 507, 509, 50 N.E. 1027, 1028 (1898)
(conditional language created a restriction rather than a condition and thus did not
impair marketability of title under sale contract subject to restrictions); Ayling v.
Kramer, 133 Mass. 12, 13 (1882) (conditional language created restriction breaching
covenant against encumbrances).
133. Clark v. Martin, 49 Pa. 289, 298 (1865).
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early to read conditional language in deeds to create servitudes enforceable by
injunction rather than conditions enforceable by forfeiture. By the late nine-
teenth century, restrictions in many of these jurisdictions were commonly writ-
ten in covenant rather than conditional language. The author's study of Suf-
folk County deeds from 1870 to 1930 failed to turn up a single deed restriction
containing a reverter or right of reentry clause.
In other parts of the country, the use of defeasible fees remained common
for a longer time. Deeds written in the twentieth century using defeasible fees
for land use control appear in cases from Colorado, 134 Kentucky, 135 Mon-
tana, 1 6 Virginia, 137 Missouri,"18 Texas, 139 the District of Columbia,'4 0 Ari-
zona,' 14 California,'142 Oregon,'143 and Michigan. 14 The author's review of
deeds from Franklin County, Ohio revealed that use of defeasible fees was
nearly universal in that locality until around 1920.145 Even in states where
other forms of restrictions were quite advanced, the defeasible fee continued in
use.14 6 In California, use of the defeasible fee for land use planning proved
particularly tenacious: reported cases deal with defeasible fee restrictions
drafted as late as the 1940's." 7
It is curious that use of the defeasible fee persisted in some jurisdictions
134. Wolf v. Hallenbeck, 109 Colo. 70, 123 P.2d 412, 413 (1942) (1935 deed).
135. Klasener v. Robinson, 30 Ky. Law. Rep. 1032, 100 S.W. 255 (1907) (1902
deed).
136. Northwestern Improvement Co. v. Lowry, 104 Mont. 289, 66 P.2d 792
(1937) (1910 deed).
137. Pence v. Tidewater Townsite Corp., 127 Va. 447, 103 S.E. 694 (1920)
(1907 deed).
138. Koehler v. Rowland, 275 Mo. 573, 580, 205 S.W. 217, 218 (1918) (1905
deed).
139. W.F. White Land Co. v. Christenson, 14 S.W.2d 369 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928)
(1924 deed).
140. Edwards v. West Woodridge Theatre, 55 F.2d 524 (D.C. Cir. 1931).
141. O'Malley v. Central Methodist Church, 67 Ariz. 245, 249, 194 P.2d 444
(1948) (ca. 1911 deeds).
142. Arrowhead Mut. Serv. Co. v. Faust, 260 Cal. App. 2d 567, 67 Cal. Rptr.
325 (1968) (1927 deed); Shields v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say., 225 Cal.
App. 2d 330, 37 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1964) (1926 deed); Beran v. Harris, 91 Cal. App. 2d
562, 205 P.2d 107 (1949) (1947 option contract); Aller v. Berkeley Hall School
Found., 40 Cal. App. 2d 31, 103 P.2d 1052 (1940) (1924 deed); Moe v. Gier, 116 Cal.
App. 403, 2 P.2d 852 (1931) (1925 deed); Cornbleth v. Allen, 80 Cal. App. 459, 251
P. 87 (1926) (1920 deed).
143. Duester v. Alvin, 74 Or. 544, 145 P. 660 (1915) (1907 deed).
144. Whealkate Mining Co. v. Mulari, 152 Mich. 607, 116 N.W. 360 (1908)
(1902 deed).
145. Of the Franklin County (Columbus, Ohio) subdivisions the author reviewed
from 1910 or earlier which had deed restrictions, all sixteen had deed restrictions
drafted in conditional form. Of the subdivisions studied from 1920 which had deed
restrictions, three out of five had deed restrictions drafted in covenant form.
146. Carruthers v. Spaulding, 242 A.D. 412, 275 N.Y.S. 37 (1934) (1928 deed).
147. See Beran v. Harris, 91 Cal. App. 2d 562, 205 P.2d 107 (1949) (1947 op-
tion contract requiring conditional restrictions to be written in deed).
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and not in others. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the
practitioner was probably even more attentive to local legal authority than is
true today, so this variation may in some instances be explained by local
precedents or statutes that encouraged the use of defeasible fees or discour-
aged the use of other kinds of restrictions. In California, for example, where
the defeasible fee was used widely over a long period of time, 48 alternative
devices were blocked by the Civil Code or by the courts. Real covenants could
not be used because courts interpreted sections 1461 and 1462 41 of the Civil
Code to prohibit the running of burdens at law. 50 Easements were also limited
by statute.' 5' Equitable servitudes were grudgingly acknowledged by the
courts, but strictly limited in their application.' 2 For example, the California
courts never recognized the implication of equitable servitudes from a common
subdivision plan to permit enforcement among neighbors regardless of order of
purchase. 53 Moreover, equitable servitudes were not allowed to exist in gross,
and thus were of no use to a developer who sold off land in the vicinity of the
restricted parcel. 54 Widespread use of defeasible fees was a natural result of
these limitations on other forms of restrictions. 55
In Massachusetts, where the author's review of Suffolk County deeds
turned up a number of deeds with restrictions but none with restrictions
drafted in conditional form, 56 the relative infrequency of conditional restric-
tions can be attributed to the early development of equitable servitudes.' It
may also be explained by the early tendencies of Massachusetts courts to in-
terpret conditional language to create covenants'58 and to restrict conditional
estates in such matters as transfers of rights of reentry. 59 Because the Massa-
chusetts courts were willing to enforce restrictions at equity, the conservative
development of real covenants enforceable at law 60 did not, apparently, com-
148. See cases cited supra note 142.
149. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1461-62 (1872).
150. See Los Angeles Terminal Land Co. v. Muir, 136 Cal. 36, 41, 68 P. 308,
309-10 (1902).
151. CAL. CIV. CODE § 801 (1872); Werner v. Graham, 181 Cal. 174, 180-81,
183 P. 945, 947 (1919).
152. Werner v. Graham, 181 Cal. 174, 183 P. 945 (1919).
153. McBride v. Freeman, 191 Cal. 152, 215 P. 678 (1923).
154. Marra v. Aetna Const. Co., 15 Cal. 2d 375, 378, 101 P.2d 490, 492 (1940).
155. See Burby, Land Burdens in California, Equitable Land Burdens, 10 S.
CAL. L. REv. 280, 291 (1937). The prevalent use of the defeasible fee for restricting
property in California is reflected in a form book developed for California practitioners.
See J. CROWDERLY, NEw BOOK OF FORMS 187-88 (1906).
156. See infra note 225.
157. See Parker v. Nightingale, 88 Mass. (6 Allen) 341, 344 (1863); Whitney v.
Union Ry., 77 Mass. (I 1 Gray) 359 (1858) (superseded by statute) (early Massachu-
setts cases recognizing equitable servitudes).
158. See cases cited supra note 132.
159. See Rice v. Boston & W. R.R., 94 Mass. (12 Allen) 141, 142 (1886) (su-
perseded by statute); note 238 infra (discussing the general issue of alienability of
rights of entry and possibilities of reverter).
160. See authorities cited supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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pel drafters to resort to conditional restrictions.
The author's review of District of Columbia deeds found that deed re-
strictions appeared there quite late, and when they appeared, were generally
not drafted in conditional form.' This is consistent with the development of
the case law of land use restrictions in the District. Cases involving such re-
strictions appeared quite late, after the law of equitable servitudes was well
developed, and were conventional in their adoption of that law. 62 The some-
what retarded development of deed restrictions and relative paucity of condi-
tions in Cook County, Illinois's' may have been attributable to the hostility of
the Illinois courts to both conditional 4 and equitable 65 restrictions.
In some jurisdictions, however, the nature of deed restrictions used bore
no obvious relationship to the development of the law in the courts. In Ohio,
for example, where conditional restrictions were very common,166 the develop-
ment of equitable servitudes, though perhaps somewhat retarded, was other-
wise normal. 67 One tempting explanation is that local practice was directed
by local formbooks, but a thorough search by the author failed to turn up
formbooks resembling the conditional deeds discovered. Local practice was
also no doubt shaped by particularly influential local attorneys or developers,
but, again, no direct evidence of this was found.
VI. USES OF DEFEASIBLE FEE RESTRICTIONS
The use of the defeasible fee restriction reveals much about the concerns
of developers and home buyers during the period. One of the most common
161. The author found only one subdivision with deed restrictions in the District
of Columbia platted during the period of 1870-1920. For subdivisions platted in 1910,
1920, and 1930, the author found twenty-nine deeds from eleven subdivisions contain-
ing restrictions (out of a total of seventy deeds examined from twenty-three subdivi-
sions). Of these, twenty-seven deeds from ten subdivisions were written in whole or in
part as covenants; four deeds from two subdivisions were written in whole or part as
conditions.
162. E.g., Castleman v. Avignone, 12 F.2d 326 (1926); McNeil v. Gary, 40 App.
D.C. 397 (1913).
163. The author's study of Cook County deeds found no restrictions in the deeds
of five subdivisions examined for 1880, or the seven subdivisions examined for 1910.
Three of the six subdivisions examined for 1890 were developed subject to deed restric-
tions, as were three of the five from 1900 and four of the five from 1920. The deeds
from two of the subdivisions from 1890, one from 1900, and one from 1920 used condi-
tional language. Deeds from two of the 1920 subdivisions are conditioned on race re-
strictions, though otherwise written in covenant form.
164. Star Brewery v. Primas, 163 111. 652, 658, 45 N.E. 145, 147 (1896); Galla-
her v. Herbert, 117 II1. 160, 169, 7 N.E. 511, 511-12 (1886).
165. Hutchison v. Ulrich, 145 I11. 336, 342, 34 N.E. 556, 557 (1893); Eckhart v.
Irons, 128 II1. 568, 581, 20 N.E. 687, 692 (1889).
166. See supra note 145.
167. See Brown v. Huber, 80 Ohio St. 183, 88 N.E. 322 (1909); Stines v.
Dorman, 25 Ohio St. 580 (1874); see also H. MONCHOW supra note 76, at 23 (claim-
ing that Ohio courts were hostile to restrictions).
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targets of conditional deed restrictions was the manufacture and sale of alco-
hol. 68 While the primary focus of these restrictions may not have been land
use control in a conventional sense, they appear to have been the forerunners
of broader restrictions governing the use of property, and thus are of interest.
As early as 1810, deeds began to appear conditional on the restricted property
not being used for the sale or manufacture of alcoholic beverages.1 69
These prohibitions seem to have served several distinct purposes. First and
most obviously, they were inserted in deeds to increase the value of the lots in
the development to those opposed to the use of liquor, 7 0 or to protect the
enjoyment of a residence retained by the developer within the subdivision."
Excessive use of alcohol was a serious social problem in the early nineteenth
century.17 2 The locus of the most objectional drinking was the saloon, which
was seen by many as a threat to the family and a source of public corrup-
tion. 17 3 Opposition to the saloon was also, no doubt, based on class and ethnic
distinctions. By the late nineteenth century, the neighborhood bar represented
the urban, South European Catholic immigrant influence from which many of
those buying suburban property were escaping.1 74 Deed restrictions against the
sale or manufacture of alcohol began to appear in the 1830's at the time of the
first major temperance movement in the United States.175 During the even
more pervasive temperance movement of the 1870's through the 1920's, such
168. See, e.g., Cowell v. Colorado Springs Co., 100 U.S. 55 (1879); O'Malley v.
Central Methodist Church, 67 Ariz. 245, 248, 194 P.2d 444 (1948); Collins Mfg. Co.
v. Marcy, 25 Conn. 242, 243 (1856) (1844 deed); Storke v. Penn Mut. Life Ins., 390
III. 619, 621, 61 N.E.2d 552, 553 (1945) (1889 deed); O'Brien v. Wetherell, 14 Kan.
467, 471-72 (1875) (1870 deed); Hoskins v. Walker, 255 S.W.2d 480, 481 (Ky. 1953)
(1889 deed); Jenks v. Pawlowski, 98 Mich. 110, 111, 56 N.W. 1105, 1105 (1893)
(1883 deed); Northwestern Improvement Co. v. Lowry, 104 Mont. 289, 66 P.2d 792
(1937) (1910 deed); Riverton Country Club v. Thomas, 141 N.J. Eq. 435, 58 A.2d 89,
92 (N.J. Ch.) (1900 deed), aft'd, 1 N.J. 508, 64 A.2d 347 (1948); Post v. Weil, 115
N.Y. 361, 367, 22 N.E. 145, 145 (1889) (1811 deed); see also Franklin County Deeds,
book 218, at 510 (1890); book 234, at 60 (1891); book 162, at 438 (1883); D.C. Deeds,
book 4364, at 222 (cond. 1) (1920); cf 2 W. WOOLLEN & W. THORNTON, INTOXICAT-
ING LIQUORS § 1023, at 1808 (1910) (discussing alcohol deed restrictions); Cook,
Rights of Entry, Possibilities of Reverter, Resulting Trust, and the Rule Against Per-
petuities, 15 TEMP. U.L.Q. 509, 525-26 (1941) (challenging alcohol deed restrictions).
169. Cf. Post v. Weil, 115 N.Y. 361, 367, 22 N.E. 145, 145-46 (1889) (1811
deed) (restriction later held to create a covenant instead of a condition).
170. Jetter v. Lyon, 70 Neb. 429, 432, 97 N.W. 596, 597 (1903); Jeffrey v. Gra-
ham, 61 Tex. 481, 483 (1884); cf. Watrous v. Allen, 57 Mich. 362, 364, 24 N.W. 104,
106 (1885) (purpose of restriction to limit competition).
171. See Plumb v. Tubbs, 41 N.Y. 442, 447 (1869).
172. For economic and perhaps social reasons, consumption of alcohol, particu-
larly whiskey, was substantially in excess of current rates during the nineteenth cen-
tury. See Aaron & Musto, Temperance and Prohibition in America: A Historical
Overview, in ALCOHOL AND PUBLIC POLICY 127, 131-36 (M. Moore & D. Gerstein ed.
1981); Gerstein, Alcohol Use and Consequences, in id. at 182, 195, 200-01.
173. Aaron & Musto, supra note 172, at 142-43, 150-51.
174. R. SHORE & J. LUCE, To YOUR HEALTH 31 (1976).
175. Aaron & Musto, supra note 172, at 140.
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restrictions became nearly universal in some areas .17
Second, conditions against the manufacture and sale of alcohol were also
imposed by companies developing new towns, particularly in the West. 77
Some of these restrictions were to continue only until the town was incorpo-
rated and its citizens had the opportunity to vote on the alcohol issue, 7 8 thus
preserving the possibility of local option.
Third, restrictions on the sale and manufacture of alcohol were occasion-
ally inserted in deeds to permit control, but not total elimination of the sale of
alcohol. 7 9 Employers developing workers' housing and concerned about the
productivity, and thus the sobriety, of their employees, would selectively
franchise only a few purveyors of alcohol to limit the spread of the evil of
drink in the development,8 0 and no doubt to make a profit as well.
Finally, in some instances grantors inserted conditions in deeds forbidding
the sale of alcohol explicitly to protect their own establishments from competi-
tion.' 8' Forfeiture for breach of alcohol restrictions was surprisingly com-
mon, 82 though courts were understandably more willing to enforce a forfei-
ture where a saloon was erected in the midst of a dry neighborhood than to
protect a monopoly. 83
A broader use of conditional deed restrictions was to forbid uses regarded
as nuisances in a residential district. Early deeds focused on specified highly
offensive uses: slaughterhouses, soap and glue factories, and gravel pits.' 8 As
176. See authorities cited supra note 168; Dix, Can Your Title Revert?, 70
N.J.L.J. 233, 233 (1947) (estimating that nearly one half of the titles in Trenton, New
Jersey were subject to alcohol reversion clauses).
177. See Jones v. McLain, 16 Tex. Civ. App. 305, 305-06, 41 S.W. 714, 714(1897); P. SMITH, A CITY UPON A HILL 153 (1966) (stating many western towns were
begun as temperance communities).
178. Jones v. McLain, 16 Tex. Civ. App. 305, 305-06, 41 S.W. 714, 714 (1897).
179. Fusha v. Dacono Townsite Co., 60 Colo. 315, 153 P. 226 (1915); Whealkate
Mining Co. v. Mulari, 152 Mich. 607, 609, 116 N.W. 360, 361 (1908).
180. This may have been the motive behind the restriction in Jump River Lum-
ber Co. v. Moore, 70 Wis. 173, 35 N.W. 360 (1887).
181. Burdell v. Grandi, 152 Cal. 376, 3,80, 92 P. 1022, 1023 (1907).
182. Cowell v. Colorado Springs Co., 100 U.S. 55 (1879); Fusha v. Dacono
Townsite Co., 60 Colo. 315, 153 P. 226 (1915); O'Brien v. Wetherell, 14 Kan. 467
(1875); Jetter v. Lyon, 70 Neb. 429, 97 N.W. 596 (1903); Jeffrey v. Graham, 61 Tex.
481 (1884); Odessa Imp. and Irrigation Co. v. Dawson, 5 Tex. Civ. App. 487, 24 S.W.
576 (1893); Lewiston Water & Power Co. v. Brown, 42 Wash. 555, 85 P. 47 (1906)
(evidently reflecting public's attitude against alcohol).
183. See, e.g., Burdell v. Grandi, 152 Cal. 376, 379, 92 P. 1022, 1024 (1907);
Brown v. Wrightman, 5 Cal. App. 391, 395, 90 P. 467, 468 (1907) (law will not en-
force alcohol conditions to protect monopoly).
184. See Richter v. Distelhurst, 116 A.D. 269, 271, 101 N.Y.S. 634, 635 (1906)
(no stables, slaughter houses, liquor stores, colony houses, bone or soap boiling estab-
lishments); Zweig v. Sweedler, 140 A.D. 319, 319-20, 125 N.Y.S. 171, 171 (1910) (no
slaughter houses); Franklin County Deeds, book 237, at 496 (1892) (no slaughter
house, obnoxious business, sand or gravel pits); book 232, at 568 (1892) (no sand or
gravel pits); book 218, at 344 (no slaughter house); book 524, at 131 (1912) (no
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time went on, however, lists of offensive uses in deeds became longer, 185 and
soon deeds appeared forbidding all nonresidential uses.1 86 Residential use re-
strictions came to be considered essential for subdivision development, and be-
came very common by the end of the period.'8 They were generally supported
by residents in the neighborhood, and became controversial only when.chang-
ing conditions made them a serious burden 88
Other common deed restrictions required construction of a dwelling upon
a residential subdivision lot within a specified, relatively short period after
purchase.189 At a time when developers commonly sold undeveloped lots, it
slaughter house, soap or glue factory, bone mill, or other obnoxious business).
185. Werner v. Graham, 181 Cal. 174, 177, 183 P. 945, 946 (1919) (1902-05
deeds; no saloons, tenant houses, livery stables, stores); Cornbleth v. Allen, 80 Cal.
App. 459, 460-61, 251 P. 87, 87 (1926) (1920 deed; no offices, stores, flats, lodging
house, double house, bungalow court, apartment house or business building); Cook Co.
Deed 411069 (1907) ("Shall be used, if at all, for residence purposes and shall not be
used or built upon in any manner for any purpose tending to render the same injurious
or offensive to a residential neighborhood. That . . . structure shall not be placed upon
any part of said premises for business, trade or manufacturing purposes or any purpose
unusual in an exclusive residential locality . . . and that no part of said premises shall
be used for any business, trade or manufacturing purpose or any purpose unusual in an
exclusive residential locality"); Franklin County Deeds, book 237, at 238 (1892) ("bus-
iness trade or calling which may be noxious or offensive"); book 528, at 213 (1912)
("no tannery, fertilizer or bone factory, soup factory, livery stable, brickyard or brick-
kiln," nor "manufacture, mining or trading purposes whatsoever," nor use "for any
purpose which shall be or become obnoxious or detrimental" to the neighborhood);
book 645, at 510 (1921) (no "Slaughter house or houses, tannery, fertilizer, bone or
soap factory" or "any business objectionable or offensive to a good residence neighbor-
hood"). By the mid-1920's, controls on the number, type and form of construction of
accessory buildings on lots also became common, the most frequent being a require-
ment that garages be positioned to face alleys. Nolte, Restrictions for the Man of
Moderate Means, Home Building and Subdividing, 3 ANNALS ON REAL EST. PRAC.
386, 391 (1927); see also Schulman v. Ellenville Elec. Co., 152 Misc. 843, 273 N.Y.S.
530 (1934) (electric wires must be placed underground), affd, 248 A.D. 662, 288
N.Y.S. 11 (1936).
186. McMurtry v. Phillips Inv. Co., 103 Ky. 308, 311, 45 S.W. 96, 96 (1898);
Rumford Falls Power Co. v. Waishwell, 128 Me. 320, 321, 147 A. 343, 343 (1929)
(1928 deed); Franklin County Deeds, book 658, at 170 (1921).
187. Seventy of the eighty-four subdivisions studied by Monchow were limited in
whole or part to residential use. See H. MONCHOW, supra note 76, at 28-37.
188. See authorities cited supra note 32; see also infra note 250 (authorities
addressing problem of changed conditions).
189. Hopkins v. Smith, 162 Mass. 444, 445, 38 N.E. 1122, 1122 (1894) (1868
deed; building dwelling house within one year); O'Brien v. Wagner, 94 Mo. 93, 96, 7
S.W. 19, 19 (1888) (1864 deed; erect substantial dwelling house by July 1866); Grigg
v. Landis, 21 N.J. Eq. 494, 494 (N.J. 1870) (condition in 1867 land contract requiring
construction within one year); McArdler v. Hurley, 103 Misc. 540, 542, 172 N.Y.S.
57, 58 (Sup. Ct. 1918) (erect "a neat dwelling house" within three years); Pence v.
Tidewater Townsite Corp., 127 Va. 447, 450, 103 S.E. 694, 695 (1920) (erect building
within six months; three month extension in case of sickness); Sand v. Holbert, 93
W.Va. 574, 576, 117 S.E. 896, 896 (1923) (begin construction in three months, prose-
cute with reasonable diligence).
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was necessary to assure purchasers that a subdivision would rapidly become a
fully developed, stable residential community. Subdivision during the period
was frequently speculative and often ran well ahead of construction, resulting
in the continuing blight of many vacant lots.190 Under these circumstances,
assurances of prompt development significantly contributed to the value of a
subdivision. No doubt these conditions were also aimed at discouraging specu-
lators from buying vacant lots from developers and then reselling them at a
profit once the community began to develop.21 Conditions requiring rapid de-
velopment were also occasionally attached to grants from government enti-
ties.19' Like improvement requirements in homestead laws, they promoted a
public policy of rapid development.
Another frequently observed condition required that dwellings built on
subdivided property be of at least a certain value.'1 3 The stipulated value va-
ried widely, depending on the market targeted by the developer. 9 4 The pur-
pose of these restrictions was obvious: they permitted the subdivider to assure
potential purchasers that their houses would be surrounded by others of simi-
lar value. These restrictions continued to be popular throughout the period,
even though fluctuations in the value of money accompanying inflation and
deflation limited their usefulness, 95 difficulties of proving building cost compli-
cated their enforcement, and, in some instances, property was rendered un-
developable by their overly ambitious nature. 9 In a few cases, these restric-
tions were in fact enforced by developers.' Neighbors also on occasion tried
to enjoin the construction of cheap houses that violated these provisions. 9 8
190. See E. FISHER, supra note 18, at 139; H. JAMES, LAND PLANNING IN THE
UNITED STATES 66 (1926); Peterson, The Use of Private Land Restrictions in Planned
Urban Developments, 1960 A.B.A. SEC. ON REAL PROP., PROB. & TRUST L. PROC. 4,
5.
191. Grigg v. Landis, 21 N.J. Eq. 494, 496 (N.J. 1870); H. MONCHOW, supra
note 76, at 34.
192. Holliday v. West, 6 Cal. 519, 527 (1856); House's Lessee v. Beatty, 3 H. &
McH. 182 (Md. 1794).
193. See, e.g., Los Angeles & Ariz. Land Co. v. Marr, 187 Cal. 126, 128, 200 P.
1051, 1051 (1921) (1911 deed; $2000); Wolf v. Hallenbeck, 109 Colo. 70, 123 P.2d
412 (1942) (1935 deed, $7500); Forman v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 114 Md. 574,
575-76, 80 A. 298, 298 (1911) (1899 deed, $4000).
194. See Nichols, supra note 114, at 19. Values were often graduated within a
subdivision to target different parts of the subdivision at different markets. Nolte,
supra note 185, at 394-95; Franklin County Deeds, book 501, at 107 (1910) (some lots
no house less than $2000, others not less than $1800 or $1500).
195. H. MONCHOW, supra note 76, at 37; Bouton, Development of Roland Park,
Baltimore, in HOMEBUILDING, supra note 114, at 21, 25; Nolte, supra note 185, at
393-94.
196. Ascher, Private Covenants in Urban Redevelopment, in C. WOODBURY,
URBAN REDEVELOPMENT, PROBLEMS AND PRACTICES 239-40 (1953).
197. See Quatman v. McCray, 128 Cal. 285, 289, 60 P. 855, 855-56 (1900)
(property forfeited for construction of $400 house where $1200 house required).
198. See Isham v. Matchett, 18 Ohio C.C. 338, 10 0. Cir. Dec. 267 (1899)
(injunction against barn violating restriction against buildings costing less than $1500).
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Concern for uniformity of development also prompted conditions requir-
ing that buildings follow certain forms of construction. Common restrictions
set minimum or maximum numbers of stories or rooms to determine building
size.199 Other restrictions required that exteriors be built of brick or iron,200 or
that purchasers plant shade trees.2 ' In later deeds, restrictions appeared that
gave developers open-ended control by requiring that any plans for new con-
struction be approved by the developer or by an architectural committee.
20 2
Conditional deed restrictions also were used to enforce uniform develop-
ment of open space surrounding buildings. Many deeds throughout the period
were conditioned upon the observance of building setback lines, most often at
the front of the property, 20 3 but also, on occasion, at the side and rear.20 4 Set-
back requirements were imposed to preserve pedestrian ways, prevent over-
crowding, protect access to light and air, and preserve uniformity of develop-
199. See, e.g., Cornbleth v. Allen, 80 Cal. App. 459, 460, 251 P. 87, 87 (1926)
(2 story house); Keening v. Ayling, 126 Mass. 404, 405 (1879) (not less than 3 stories);
see Franklin County Deeds, book 218, at 510 (1890) ("not less than 6 rooms or other
than modern architecture").
200. See, e.g., Roberts v. Porter, 100 Ky. 130, 131, 37 S.W. 485, 485 (1896)
(brick); Keening v. Ayling, 126 Mass. 404, 405 (1879) (brick, stone, or iron); W.F.
White Land Co. v. Christenson, 14 S.W.2d 369, 370 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) (brick,
brick veneer, stone, or steel).
201. See, e.g., Grigg v. Landis, 21 N.J. Eq. 494 (N.J. 1870) (condition in land
contract).
202. Arrowhead Mut. Serv. Co. v. Faust, 260 Cal. App. 2d 567, 573, 67 Cal.
Rptr. 325, 329 (1968); Girard v. Miller, 214 Cal. App. 2d 266, 271, 29 Cal. Rptr. 359,
361 (1968); Ascher, supra note 196, at 236-37; Bouton, supra note 195, at 25; Nichols,
supra note 114, at 18-19; Nichols, supra note 119, at 137-39; Pomeroy, How Should
the Platting of Suburban Territory be Controlled?, 3 ANNALS ON REAL EST. PRAC.
335, 348 (1927).
203. See, e.g., Childs v. Newfield, 136 Cal. App. 217, 218-19, 28 P.2d 924, 925
(1934) (30 feet); Skinner v. Shepard, 130 Mass. 180, 180 (1881) (25 feet); Kingston v.
Busch, 176 Mich. 566, 567, 142 N.W. 754, 754 (1913) (15 feet); see also Firth v.
Marovich, 160 Cal. 257, 258, 116 P. 729, 729 (1911) (requiring buildings to be built
20 feet from street, and barns and sheds to be built within 90 feet of street). J.M.
Nolte, who studied deed restrictions in 1927, found the average setback line to be
about twenty-five feet. Nolte, supra note 185, at 390. Many subdivision deeds ex-
amined by the author contained setback conditions, some quite ornate. For example,
the following language was found in Cook County Deed 902635 (1920):
No building nor any part thereof shall be erected or maintained on the
twenty-five foot (25') space laying [sic] between the front lot line and a line
(hereby designated the "building line") drawn parallel to and twenty-five feet
(25') back of said front line; provided however, that sun parlors, may extend
beyond said building line for a distance of not more than eight feet (8') and
further provided, however, that porches, stairs, and bay windows may extend
beyond said building line for a distance of not more than ten feet (10') pro-
vided however, that no porches, stairs, or bay windows may extend directly in
front of sun parlors.
204. See Firth v. Marovich, 160 Cal. 257, 258, 116 P. 729, 730 (1911) (requir-
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ment.2 °5 Though these provisions were occasionally violated by actual
construction of dwellings, they were most commonly violated by bay windows,
porches, and other protrusions from buildings. 20 At the end of the period
under review, more sophisticated developers moved away from rigid and uni-
form setback lines to requirements for plan approval in order to allow harmo-
nious variety of building locations and architectural styles.
2 0 7
A final conditional restriction, the racial exciasion, became common, in-
deed in some areas ubiquitous, in the 1890's and early 1900's.208 A great many
deeds written during this period provided that if the property were sold or
leased to or occupied by members of excluded racial groups, it would revert to
the grantor. Blacks (referred to as Negroes, Africans, or Ethiopians) were the
racial group most commonly excluded, but many deeds excluded all non-Cau-
casians, and others, particularly in the West, excluded Orientals
(Mongolians).20 9
Race restrictions were regarded at the time by some as essential for
planned, restricted developments.2 10 They allowed developers to achieve
205. See Gillis v. Bailey, 21 N.H. 149, 155-56 (1850).
206. This problem in turn generated more complex restrictions by developers.
See H. MONCHOW, supra note 76, at 38-43; Bouton, supra note 195, at 27. The Suf-
folk County deeds studied by the author, though written in covenant rather than condi-
tional form, seem particularly concerned with this problem. See, e.g., Suffolk County
Deeds, book 3519, at 327 (1911) ("no building or part thereof and no fence over six
feet shall be erected within fifteen feet of said Mildred Avenue except that doorsteps,
porticos, cornices, piazzas and baywindows may project into said reserved space of
fifteen feet.").
207. Bouton, supra note 195, at 24-25; Nichols, supra note 114, at 18.
208. See Bouton, supra note 195, at 28 (claiming that racial restrictions were
universal in Baltimore in the 1920's, even in subdivisions not otherwise restricted); see
also cases cited infra note 214. The rise of the racial deed restiiction was one of the
most striking phenomena encountered in the author's study of deed restrictions. In
Franklin County, none of the deeds before 1900 contained racial restrictions. Four of
the five subdivisions studied which were platted in 1920 were racially restricted. The
racial restriction seems to account for the sudden popularity of the use of deed restric-
tions in the District of Columbia after 1900. All deeds reviewed in the District of Co-
lumbia from 1920 and 1930 that contained restrictions in addition to setback require-
ments, contained restrictions excluding blacks. Some of these restrictions were quite
elaborate. See, e.g., book 6487, at 441 (1930) ("subject to the covenant that said land
and premises shall not be leased, rented, sold, demised, transferred or conveyed unto or
in trust for, or permitted to be occupied by any negro or colored person or persons of
negro blood or extraction"). In the Cook County deeds examined, racial restrictions
became very common during the 1920's, and were commonly written in conditonal lan-
guage, even though the restrictions were otherwise written in covenant form. See, e.g.,
Cook County Deeds 8936752, 8941773, 9023635, 9115295, (1925). Only one of the
deeds examined from Suffolk County contained racial restrictions. See Suffolk County
Deeds, book 3523, at 137 (1911). Warner noted the lack of race restrictions in Boston
in his study of the period. See S. WARNER, supra note 13, at 122.
209. H. MONCHOW, supra note 76, at 50; D.C. Deeds, book 3327, at 340 (1910).
210. See 7 NAT'L CONF. ON CITY PLAN. app. A, at 264-66 (1915).
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through private restrictions what could not be done through zoning. 1' Their
importance is demonstrated by the suggestion of Helen Monchow, in her ex-
tensive study of deed restrictions published in 1928, that developers may want
to single out racial restrictions for the extreme sanction of forfeiture even
though restrictions were otherwise written in covenant form and thus enforcea-
ble only by suits for damages or injunctive relief.2 12 Several deeds examined
by the author in Chicago and one deed in the District of Columbia were writ-
ten in this form. Most restrictions were written in covenant form, but specific
and emphatic provision was made for forfeiture for violation of racial occu-
pancy conditional restrictions.
2 13
Courts uniformly enforced racial restrictions on occupancy (though not
necessarily on sale) until the 1950's, finding them to violate neither the Consti-
tution nor public policy. 214 Indeed, the defeasible fee formed one of the last
barricades of proponents of legal residential racial segregation. In 1948, the
Supreme Court, in Shelley v. Kraemer,2 5 swept the records clear of all other
forms of racially exclusive deed restrictions by holding that the fourteenth
amendment forbade their enforcement through the state courts. Seven years
later, the North Carolina Supreme Court, in Charlotte Park and Recreation
Commission v. Barriger,2 6 held that Shelley v. Kraemer did not apply to de-
terminable fees limited by racial restrictions, since the determinable interest
terminated automatically without state involvement if the racial limitation was
violated. The Supreme Court denied certiorari."' This decision provoked ex-
tensive commentary, most of it negative,2 8 but is of doubtful continuing effect.
Developments in civil rights law'1 9 and, it is hoped, in public morality have
211. Bruce, Racial Zoning by Private Contract in the Light of the Constitutions
and the Rule Against Restraints on Alienation, 21 ILL. L. REV. 704, 708-17 (1927).
Even before Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), the Su-
preme Court had held that zoning could not be used to enforce racial segregation.
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 82 (1917).
212. H. MoNcHow, supra note 76, at 65.
213. D.C. Deeds book 4354, at 270 (1920); see also Cook County Deeds
9023635 (1925); 8941773 (1925); 91152295 (1925); 8936752 (1925).
214. See Edwards v. West Woodridge Theater, 55 F.2d 524, 526 (1931); Los
Angeles Inv. Co. v. Gary, 181 Cal. 680, 685-89, 186 P. 596, 597-98 (1919); Schulte v.
Starks, 238 Mich. 102, 103, 213 N.W. 102, 102 (1927); Koehler v. Rowland, 275 Mo.
573, 585-86, 205 S.W. 217, 220 (1918); H. MONCHOW, supra note 76, at 49-50.
215. 334 U.S. 1, 23 (1948).
216. 242 N.C. 311, 322, 88 S.E.2d 114, 123 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 983
(1956).
217. 350 U.S. 383 (1956).
218. Charlotte Park is discussed in several Notes. Note, 8 HASTINGS L.J. 96
(1956); Note, 27 Miss. L.J. 145 (1956); Note, 21 Mo. L. REV. 93 (1956); Note, 30
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 285 (1956); Note, 29 S. CAL. L. REV. 498 (1956); Note, 34 TEx.
L. REV. 767 (1956); Note, 13 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 28 (1956); Note, 58 W. VA. L.
REV. 185 (1956).
219. In particular, Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§
3601-3631 (1982) forbids racial discrimination in most real estate transactions and
would probably preclude the enforcement of racial conditions in most situations.
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precluded a resurgence of defeasible fee limitations to enforce racial
segregation.
The use and form of deed restrictions varied significantly during the pe-
riod under consideration. Several observations can be made about the patterns
of this variation as to deed restrictions in general that also apply specifically to
defeasible fee restrictions where they were used.
As the period unfolded, residential deed restrictions changed in form and
character. The most significant overall trend was toward increasing use of
deed restrictions.22 While deed restrictions were rare early in the period, they
were common by 1920.221 They also became more complex. While deed re-
strictions in the 1870's and 1880's were often limited to the prohibition of the
sale and manufacture of alcohol and of offensive, nuisance-like222 uses, by the
1920's they had become prolix and complicated, often divided into numbered
paragraphs providing for comprehensive control over development through a
variety of alternative sanctions 2 3 Some read like miniature zoning
220. This is dramatically illustrated in the District of Columbia. None of the 18
deeds examined for 1870 or of the ten deeds examined for 1880, one of the 17 deeds
examined for 1890, and none of the 12 deeds examined for 1890 contained deed re-
strictions. However, 11 of the 20 deeds examined for 1920 and 15 of the 21 deeds
examined for 1930 contained deed restrictions.
221. None of the six Suffolk County deeds examined for 1860 and only four of
the 18 deeds examined for 1870 (three in the same development) included any restric-
tions. Three of the eight deeds examined for 1920 included restrictions. In Cook
County, none of the deeds examined for subdivisions platted in 1871 or 1880 contained
restrictions, seven of the 14 for 1890; six of the nine for 1900; none of the 19 for 1910;
and nine of the 12 for 1920.
222. See Suffolk County Deeds, book 1010, at 61 (1870). This deed provided
that:
The premises are conveyed subject to the restriction that no stable, bar-room
billiard room or other erection the use of which will tend to injure this or the
surrounding property as a neighborhood or good class dwelling houses, shall
be allowed on the premises for ten years from Nov. 1, 1869.
Id.
223. See Suffolk County Deeds, book 4209, at 459 (1920) (containing six
clauses); book 2753, at 617-18 (1901). A deed found in Suffolk County Deeds, book
2753, at 617-18 contained the following remedial clause:
A violation of any of the said restrictions at any time shall give to the said
corporation and to the owner or owners of the lots next adjoining (in addition
to such remedies and relief as may be given by law to the persons intended to
be benefited thereby), the right to enter the said premises and to remove any
structures erected or placed in violation of the said restrictions, without being
liable to any action for trespass or any claim for damages and the owner of
the lot upon which such structures shall have been erected or placed shall be
held to pay all the costs of such removal. A violation of any of the above
agreements at any time shall give to this grantor or any of its assigns the
right to enter the premises of the person or persons so violating said agree-
ments and enforce the same, without becoming liable for any action for tres-
pass or any claim for damages; and the person or persons so violating any of
said agreements shall be held to pay all the costs of enforcing the same. The
foregoing agreements and restrictions shall not be personally binding on any
32




The use of deed restrictions also varied geographically and by type of
neighborhood. Developments in or immediately adjacent to established urban
areas tended to be small and to have simple restrictions or none at all. 25 The
paucity of deed restrictions in small developments may be accounted for by a
number of factors: relative unsophistication of the developers; the low priority
attributed to deed restrictions by poorer consumers of small lots in more
crowded and closer in developments; and the reliance of small developments on
complex financing arrangements involving multiple private parties, which may
have made agreement on deed restrictions more difficult.2 6
In newer, rapidly growing cities and in the more distant suburbs of estab-
lished cities, deed restrictions were more common and complex.22 7 These sub-
divisions were usually larger, laid out by more sophisticated developers, aimed
at a wealthier market, and supported by more concentrated financing.22 s They
contained larger lots more uniformly intended for single family dwellings.229 In
this context, deed restrictions were developed early and aimed at a wide vari-
ety of concerns: land use, density of development, architectural control, and
neighborhood control.2 30 Many of these deed restrictions were imposed
through defeasible fees.
person or persons except in respect of breaches committed during his, her, or
their seisin of or title to the land to which the same relate respectively.
224. See Franklin County Deeds, book 658, at 170 (1921) (nine clauses regulat-
ing or prohibiting, inter alia, uses, setbacks, location of building, cost of construction,
sale of liquor, signs, garages, billboards, and sale to blacks); book 645, at 510 (1921)
(restrictions covering, inter alia, use, size and value of buildings by lot, frontages, out-
buildings by lot, frontages, outbuildings setbacks, fence and hedge heights). For a mod-
ern example of an even more complex set of deed restrictions, see Columbia, Md.,
Covenants, in C. HAAR, LAND USE PLANNING 793-805 (1977).
225. Deed restrictions never became common during the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries in Suffolk County; of the 17 subdivision deeds examined for
1910, only 4 contained restrictions; of the 7 deeds examined for 1920, only 3 contained
restrictions, of the 14 deeds examined for 1930, none contained restrictions.
226. These characteristics of the development of Suffolk County during the pe-
riod under study were extensively examined in the classic study of S. WARNER, supra
note 13, at 117-52.
227. Five of the six Franklin County subdivisions examined for 1910 were sold
subject to deed restrictions, as were five of the seven subdivisions from 1920 and one of
the two from 1930. The more complex deeds in more developed cities also appear in
wealthier neighborhoods. See Suffolk County Deeds, book 2753, at 615 (1901) (deed
from Riverbank Improvement Company for property reclaimed and developed along
Bay State Road).
228. H. MONCHOW, supra note 76, at 9. These characteristics seem to typify
much of the development in Franklin County during the period under consideration.
229. Id.
230. See Bouton, supra note 195, at 24-28; Nichols, supra note 114, at 16-19;
see also S. Mott & M. Wehrly, Subdivision Regulations and Protective Covenants, in
URBAN LAND INSTITUTE, TECHNICAL BULLETIN 8 at 5-8 (1947) (later example of the
complex deed restrictions developed during this period).
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VII. DEFICIENCIES OF THE DEFEASIBLE FEE AS A LAND USE PLANNING
DEVICE
The popularity of the defeasible fee as a land use planning device was
relatively brief. It is not difficult to understand its demise. From the start, the
courts were hostile to the use of forfeiture as a tool for land use planning.
Traditional abhorrence of forfeitures disposed the courts against enforcing
deed restrictions written in conditional language through defeasance. 231 Judges
found numerous ways of avoiding forfeiture. The simplest approach was to
construe a condition strictly to avoid finding a violation.2 2 Other approaches
attacked the use of defeasible fees more directly.
Courts frequently permitted defendants to interpose equitable defenses to
avoid forfeiture. The most frequently sustained equitable defenses were estop-
pel, waiver and laches (or, closely related, failure to claim forfeiture within the
statute of limitations).233 At least one court refused to enforce a forfeiture
where there was no fault or negligence on the part of the grantee in the breach
of the condition.234 Another equity court, claiming "equity abhors forfeitures,"
refused to enforce a forfeiture, asserting that the plaintiff had an adequate
remedy at law. 235 Others held that grantors could only enforce conditions if
they retained property to which the restricted property was appurtenant, effec-
tively creating a new rule that conditions could not exist in gross. 236 Finally,
231. E.g., Hawley v. Kafitz, 148 Cal. 393, 83 P. 248 (1905); Watrous v. Allen,
57 Mich. 362, 24 N.W. 104 (1885); Rockwell v. Utz, 79 Misc. 120, 139 N.Y.S. 529
(1913); see also Walsh, supra note 88, at 172-73.
232. See Pank v. Eaton, 115 Mo. App. 171, 176-77, 89 S.W. 586, 587 (1905)
(condition limiting use to dwelling house not violated by apartment); Goldstein, supra
note 88, at 264.
233. See, e.g., Los Angeles & Ariz. Land Co. v. Marr, 187 Cal. 126, 133-34, 200
P. 1051, 1053-54 (1921) (waiver); Hanna v. Rodeo-Vellejo Ferry Co., 89 Cal. App.
462, 468, 265 P. 287, 289 (1928) (waiver); Brown v. Wrightman, 5 Cal. App. 391,
394-95, 90 P. 467, 468 (1907) (waiver and estoppel); Storke v. Penn Mut. Life Ins.,
390 I11. 619, 628, 61 N.E.2d 552, 557 (1945) (statute of limitations); Tower v.
Compton Hill Improvement Co., 192 Mo. 379, 91 S.W. 104 (1905) (waiver, election of
remedies, statute of limitations); Lehigh Coal & Navigation Co. v. Early, 162 Pa. 338,
340, 29 A. 736, 736 (1894) (laches); Jones v. McLain, 16 Tex. Civ. App. 305, 307-08,
41 S.W. 714, 715 (1897) (waiver); Goldstein, supra note 88, at 265-66 (waiver as
equitable defenses to forfeiture); Comment, Right of Reentry, Title, and Color of Title
Under Texas Three Year Limitation Statute, 21 S. TEx. L.J. 389, 427-28 (1981) (ap-
plication of statute of limitations to rights of entry); see also Northwestern Improve-
ment Co. v. Lowry, 104 Mont. 289, 66 P.2d 792, 794 (1937) (a tax deed conveys
absolute title free from all encumbrances except tax lien); Alamogordo Improvement
Co. v. Hennessee, 40 N.M. 162, 165, 56 P.2d 1127, 1129 (1936) (finding that a tax
sale destroys a condition).
234. Collins Mfg. Co. v. Marcy, 25 Conn. 242 (1856); Goldstein, supra note 88,
at 265; Grigg v. Landis, 21 N.J. Eq. 494 (N.J. 1870) (substantial compliance with the
condition).
235. Pence v. Tidewater Townsite Corp., 127 Va. 447, 457, 103 S.E. 694, 696-98
(1920).
236. See, e.g., Barrie v. Smith, 47 Mich. 130, 133-34, 10 N.W. 168, 170 (1881);
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some courts construed conditional restrictions as enforceable only for a reason-
able period of time.317
Forfeiture could also be avoided through conservative application of tradi-
tional defeasible fee doctrine. For example, absent legislation to the contrary,
neither rights of entry nor possibilities of reverter were transferable inter vivos
in many jurisdictions. 238 Indeed, a number of courts held that an attempted
transfer of a right of entry destroyed it.23 9 Under these doctrines, the right to
McArdle v. Hurley, 103 Misc. 540, 543, 172 N.Y.S. 57, 58-59 (1918); Richter v. Dis-
telhurst, 116 A.D. 269, 273, 101 N.Y.S. 634, 636 (1906); Jones v. Van Deboe Hager
Co., 29 Ohio L. Abst. 385, 389-90 (1939); Walsh, supra note 88, at 175-76. But cf.
authorities cited supra note 115.
237. Goldstein, supra note 88, at 264.
238. The Restatement of Property took the position that possibilities of reverter
were alienable inter vivos (§ 159 (1936)) and rights of entry were generally not (§
160). This reflects recent case authority to the extent that the vast majority of cases
have held that, absent a statute to the contrary, a right of entry cannot be conveyed
inter vivos. See Rice v. Boston & W.R. Corp., 94 Mass. (12 Allen) 141, 143 (1866); 1
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 42, § 4.68; 2 R. DEVLIN, supra note 123, at
90; 1 W. SHEPPARD, supra note 36, at 120; 4 L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 88, at
1862; 2 E. WASHBURN, supra note 75, at 451; Annot., 53 A.L.R.2D 224, 240-50
(1957). A bare majority of cases have held that a possibility of reverter is alienable
(though a substantial number of cases have held them inalienable). See Carruthers v.
Leonard, 254 S.W. 779 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923) (alienable); Regular Predestinarian
Baptist Church v. Parker, 373 I11. 607, 609-10, 27 N.E.2d 522, 523 (1940) (inaliena-
ble); 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 42, at § 4.70; L. SIMES & A. SMITH,
supra note 88, § 1860; Annot., supra at 321-37. As to possibilities of reverter, however,
the RESTATEMENT appears to represent the modern trend; many of the older cases tend
to support the generally held view that at common law, possibilities of reverter were
inalienable. Presbyterian Church v. Venable, 159 I11. 215, 218, 42 N.E. 836, 837
(1896); 1 H. TIFFANY, supra note 89, § 132, at 474; Roberts, Assignability of Pos-
sibilities of Reverter and Rights of Re-entry, 22 B.U.L. REV. 43-48 (1942); Annot.,
supra at 228-29. The cases on inter vivos alienability generally concern charitable do-
nations or grants to railroads, yet several land use control cases recognize in dicta the
nonassignability rule, see Ingersoll Eng'g & Constr. Co. v. Crocker, 228 F. 844, 849
(6th Cir. 1915); Hopkins v. Smith, 162 Mass. 444, 447-48, 38 N.E. 1122, 1123 (1894);
Carruthers v. Spaulding, 242 A.D. 412, 414, 25 N.Y.S. 37, 39 (1934), and at least one
case held that the possibility of reverter created by a racial restriction to be transfera-
ble. See Edwards v. West Woodridge Theater, 69 App. D.C. 362, 369, 55 F.2d 524,
526 (1931). A number of jurisdictions have enacted statutes permitting the alienation
of rights of entry or possibilities of reverter or both. Los Angeles & Ariz. Land Co. v.
Marr, 187 Cal. 126, 128, 200 P. 1051, 1051 (1921); Riverton Country Club v.
Thomas, 141 N.J. Eq. 435, 444, 58 A.2d 89, 95 (N.J. Ch. 1948); 1 AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY, supra note 42, § 4.68, at 528 n.8, § 4.70, at 530 n.1; 4 L. SIMES & A.
SMITH, supra note 88, § 1862, at 180-81 nn.88-89; RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 160
(1936); Annot., supra at 237-40, 250-57. The inalienability rule, though based on judi-
cial hostility to conditions, may in fact have made it more difficult to clear up titles of
outstanding reverters. See Fratcher, supra note 81, at 522.
239. Rice v. Boston & W. R.R., 12 Allen 141, 143 (Mass. 1866); 1 AMERICAN
LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 42, § 4.69; White, Reversionary Restrictions, 14 U.
CINN. L. REV. 524, 534-35 (1940); Williams, Restrictive Covenants with Reverter
Clauses, 31 NEB. L. REV. 201, 204-13 (1951); Ulman, Future Interest: Alienation of
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enforce conditional or limitational restrictions could not be transferred to or
enforced by persons other than the original grantor, such as neighbors.24°
Though the hostility of courts to forfeiture was a constant theme through-
out the period, forfeiture was in fact sometimes permitted when conditions
were breached.2 41 Moreover, readily available means to avoid enforcement of
conditions were at times passed up by the courts. Although established doc-
trine required demand or attempted reentry before enforcement of forfeiture
for breach of condition subsequent,242 courts usually waived this require-
ment.243 Likewise, courts did not necessarily reject conditions subsequent or
determinable limitations as restraints on alienation,2 4 or violations of the Rule
Against Perpetuities. 245 But, on the whole, antipathy to defeasance was the
Right of Entry Upon Condition Subsequent as Destroying It, 18 MICH. S.B.J. 93
(1938); Note, Future Interests: Transferability of Right of Entry, 32 MICH. L. REv.
415 (1934); Annot., supra note 238, at 257-63.
240. Cf Richter v. Distelhurst, 116 A.D. 269, 101 N.Y. Supp. 634 (1906) (con-
dition in a deed from the executors of an estate is unenforceable as the right of entry
can only be enforced by a grantor or his heirs, and the executors [presumably long
since dead] can have no heirs).
241. See cases cited supra note 182; see also Quatman v. McCray, 128 Cal. 285,
60 P. 885 (1900); Gray v. Blanchard, 215 Mass. (8 Pick.) 289 (1829); Rumford Falls
Power Co. v. Waishwell, 128 Me. 320, 147 A. 343 (1929); Koehler v. Rowland, 275
Mo. 573, 205 S.W. 217 (1918); O'Brien v. Wagner, 94 Mo. 93, 7 S.W. 19 (1888).
242. W. SHEPPARD, supra note 36, at 121; 2 E. WASHBURN, supra note 75, at
451.
243. See Fusha v. Dacono Townsite Co., 60 Colo. 315, 319, 153 P. 226, 227
(1915); Sioux City & St. P. R.R. v. Singer, 49 Minn. 301, 307, 51 N.W. 905, 907
(1892); Lewiston Water & Power Co. v. Brown, 42 Wash. 555, 85 P. 47, 47-48 (1906);
Pence v. Tidewater Townsite Co., 127 Va. 447, 454, 103 S.E. 694, 696 (1920); Bow-
man, supra note 88, at 619, 620 (1918). But see Carruthers v. Spaulding, 242 A.D.
412, 25 N.Y.S. 37 (1934) (reentry necessary to terminate estate).
244. Cowell v. Springs Co., 100 U.S. 55, 57 (1879) (condition only affects use);
Firth v. Marovich, 160 Cal. 257, 260-61, 116 P. 729, 731 (1911) (power of alienation
not restrained, merely limitation on estate conveyed); Cornbleth v. Allen, 80 Cal. App.
459, 463, 251 P. 87, 88 (1926) (restriction on use not alienation); Duester v. Alvin, 74
Or. 544, 551, 145 P. 660, 662 (1915) (permissible partial restraint); see Goldstein,
supra note 88, at 250 (there is no suspension of the right of alienation as there is
always a combination of persons who can alienate property). But see Fratcher, supra
note 81, at 513-17 (criticizing American deviation from the older common law which
was more hostile to permanent conditional restrictions on property). An absolute re-
straint on alienation in conditional form is, of course, void.
245. Tobey v. Mixer, 130 Mass. 448, 450 (1881); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §
372 (1944); L. SiMEs & SMITH, supra note 88, at 1238-39; Acts, supra note 32, at 211,
255; Loring, Estates on Condition, 1 Am. L. REV. 265, 266 (1867). But see J. GRAY,
RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES §§ 304-12 (1886) (arguing that fees simple subject to a
condition subsequent are not subject to the rule but fees simple determinable are).
Modern English authority holds conditional fees subject to the rule. See In re Da
Costa, 1 Ch. 337 (1912); Report of the Committee on Improving Conveyancing and
Recording Practices, A.B.A. SEC. ON REAL PROP., PROB. & TRUST L., PROc. 73, 76
n.15 (1957) [hereinafter cited as 1957 A.B.A.], though English commentators have
noted that this is contrary to the earlier common law. See Jenks, Future Interests in
Land, 20 L.Q. REV. 280, 291 (1904). It is possible that American law is based on
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rule, enforcement the exception.
Even when courts did not expressly refuse to enforce conditions or limita-
tions through forfeiture, they frequently achieved the same result by constru-
ing conditional language to create covenants or equitable servitudes.2 46 The
restrictions would then be enforced through injunctive relief rather than forfei-
ture. Courts were especially likely to interpret conditional language to create
an equitable servitude or covenant rather than a defeasible fee if a deed con-
tained no reversion or reentry clause-if the remedy of forfeiture was not ex-
plicitly reserved. 247 Courts also frequently granted injunctions to enforce con-
ditions in suits brought by neighbors of the violator.148 Such neighbors were, of
course, interested in the equitable relief rather than forfeiture, and seldom
held a right of entry or possibility of reverter. Neighbors could equitably en-
force conditions reserved by a grantor under the theory that, by accepting a
conditional deed, the grantee made a promise to abide by the conditions inde-
pendently enforceable at equity. 49
Courts not only interpreted conditions as equitable servitudes, but some
jurisdictions applied the changed conditions defense to enforcement of equita-
ble servitudes to avoid enforcing conditions at all. 250 The tendency of the
confusion about English law. See Cook, supra note 168, at 516-19.
246. Arrowhead Mut. Serv. Co. v. Faust, 260 Cal. App. 2d 567, 67 Cal. Rptr.
325 (1968) (injunction granted); Kingston v. Busch, 176 Mich. 566, 142 N.W. 754
(1913) (injunction granted); Watrous v. Allen, 57 Mich. 362, 24 N.W. 104, 107
(1885) (injunction granted); Williams, Restrictions on the Use of Land, Equitable Ser-
vitudes, 28 TEx. L. REV. 194, 210-13 (1949).
247. See, e.g., Hawley v. Kafitz, 148 Cal. 393, 394-95, 83 P. 248, 249-50 (1905);
Eckhart v. Irons, 128 Ill. 568, 579-80, 20 N.E. 687, 691 (1889); RESTATEMENT OF
PROPERTY § 45, comment n (1936); Walsh, supra note 88, at 173-74; White, supra
note 239, at 533-34. But see Cornbleth v. Allen, 80 Cal. App. 459, 462 (1926); Gray v.
Blanchard, 25 Mass. (8 Pick.) 284, 291 (1829); Riverton Country Club v. Thomas, 141
N.J. Eq. 435, 443, 58 A.2d 89, 95 (1948); 2 E. WASHBURN, supra note 75, at 452
(right of entry clause not necessary for condition subsequent).
248. Hopkins v. Smith, 162 Mass. 444, 38 N.E. 1122 (1894); Duester v. Alvin,
74 Or. 544, 145 P. 660 (1915); Clark v. Martin, 49 Pa. 289 (1865); Note, The Right
of Entry and Possibility of Reverter-Traditional Uses--Subdivisions-Mineral
Leases, 2 WILLIAMETTE L.J. 479, 494 (1963); Comment, Covenants Running with the
Land, Conditions Subsequent, 30 CORNELL L. REV. 395, 395 (1945). Other courts,
however, refused to permit neighbors to enjoin violations of condition, asserting condi-
tions could only be enforced by the holder of the right of entry through forfeiture
unless clearly intended to benefit other property. See, e.g., O'Malley v. Central Meth-
odist Church, 67 Ariz. 245, 254, 194 P.2d 444, 450-51 (1948); Werner v. Graham, 181
Cal. 174, 179, 183 P. 945, 947 (1919); Finchum v. Vogel, 194 So. 2d 49, 52 (Fla. Ct.
App. 1967).
249. Rowe v. May, 44 N.M. 264, 270-71, 101 P.2d 391, 395 (1940); see Gid-
dings, supra note 65, at 277 (1892).
250. Wedum-Adahl Co. v. Miller, 18 Cal. App. 2d 745, 751-53, 64 P.2d 762,
766 (1937); Letteau v. Ellis, 122 Cal. App. 584, 586, 10 P.2d 496, 497 (1932); Jones v.
Van Deboe Hager Co., 29 Oh. L. Abst. 385, 389 (Franklin Co. 1939); see Ferrier,
Determinable Fees and Fees Upon Condition Subsequent in California, 24 CALIF. L.
REV. 512, 516 (1936); Goldstein, supra note 88, at 266-71; Walsh, supra note 88, at
19841
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courts to treat conditional restrictions as equitable interests, enforceable, if at
all, only through injunctive relief, undoubtedly played a significant role in the
development and education of the bar in the lore of equitable servitudes. 25 1
The reluctance of the judiciary to enforce conditions as such was not the
only cause of the demise of the defeasible fee, which soon exhibited serious
deficiencies as a land use planning device. First, it became clear that the de-
feasible fee was in fact of little value to purchasers in a subdivision. Forfeiture
was not a remedy available to adjoining landowners, who in most instances
had the only real interest in enforcing deed restrictions. 252 The right to enforce
a conditional restriction by forfeiture could not, in many jurisdictions, be
transferred from the developer to interested residents in the subdivision or to a
property owners' association.253 Even where transfer was permitted, difficulties
with transfer to many parties of the essentially indivisible right of enforcement
made this solution impractical.154 Further, the owner of the reversionary inter-
est could at any time release it, rendering the residents of the subdivision with-
out protection. 55
If violation of a restriction was enforced through forfeiture, further
problems resulted. Once the property was forfeited to the developer for viola-
175-77, 190-92; Note, Future Interests-Effect of Change of Conditions on Rights of
Entry and Possibilities of Reverter Created to Control the Use of Land, 53 MICH. L.
REV. 246 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Note, Change of Conditions] discussing effect of
changed conditions on enforcement of conditions); see also Koehler v. Rowland, 275
Mo. 573, 205 S.W. 217 (1918) (suggesting that changed conditions might be a defense
but finding that conditions had not changed); Note, supra note 248, at 485-86 (arguing
that an advantage of the condition over the covenant for the developer is the inapplica-
bility of the changed conditions rule). But see Murray v. Trustees of the Lane Semi-
nary, 1 Ohio Op. 2d 236, 242-43, 140 N.E.2d 577, 585-86 (1958) (changed conditions
no defense to condition subsequent absent absolute impossibility); Note, Real Property:
Enactment of Sections 345-349 of N.Y. Real Property Laws: Practical Method for
Extinguishment of Useless Forfeiture Restrictions on the Use of Land in New York,
45 CORNELL L. REV. 587, 588-93 (1960) (discussion of cases rejecting changed condi-
tions doctrine). See generally Note, Terminating Conditions Unlimited in Time, 27
IND. L.J. 245 (1952).
251. Many of the earliest restrictions enforced by injunctions were written in
conditional form. See supra notes 130-33 and accompanying text. These cases enforc-
ing conditional restrictions contributed substantially to the development and articula-
tion of the law of equitable servitudes. Drafters apparently noted the fact that courts
were granting injunctions to enforce conditions, and soon began drafting deeds with
restrictions intended to be enforced by injunctions. See supra notes 156-59 and accom-
panying text (describing the evolution of deed restrictions in Massachusetts).
252. Brake, supra note 80, at 443. Conditions were, however, sometimes en-
forced by neighbors as covenants. See supra note 248.
253. Fratcher, supra note 81, at 508-09; Simes, Restricting Land Use in Califor-
nia by Right of Entry and Possibilities of Reverter, 13 HASTINGS L.J. 293, 302-03
(1962); authorities cited supra note 238.
254. Simes, supra note 253, at 303 n.53.
255. Burby, supra note 155, at 284. This was, of course, true with any form of
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tion of a condition, the restriction ceased to exist, and the developer could
resell or use the property for any other purpose.256 Moreover, rights upon for-
feiture were unclear. Established doctrine, for example, did not clearly decide
who should get the value of improvements if property was forfeited.
25 7
Another problem was the difficulty of eliminating conditions once they
became obsolete. In most jurisdictions the threat of defeasance was not, in
theory, affected by changes in the conditions of the neighborhood surrounding
the restricted property that made the restriction useless, or even pernicious. 25 8
An outdated restriction could only be released by the developer or his or her
heirs, who often could be located only with difficulty, if at all. 25 9 The owner of
a possibility of reverter or right of entry based on an obsolete limitation or
condition could use it to extort a payment for release from the owner of the
fee.260 The specter of eternal problems resulting from obsolete conditional re-
strictions made the defeasible fee an increasingly less attractive deed restric-
tion device.
Because conditional restrictions in theory made title depend on the man-
ner in which the property was in fact used or developed, the defeasible fee
made security of the title of an owner, potential purchaser, or mortgagee de-
pend on facts extraneous to the title record.26' Indeed, some conditions such as
alcohol or cost of improvement restrictions could be breached by activity not
readily discovered by visual inspection or survey. This, of course, made subse-
quent purchasers who discovered a condition during a title search nervous and
may have discouraged improvement by current owners. 62 A much more im-
256. Fratcher, supra note 81, at 508-09.
257. Casenote, Real Property-Defeasible Fees, Fixtures After Termination of
a Defeasible Fee Who Owns Structures Erected During the Existence of the Fee, 36
CORNELL L. REV. 386, 386 (1951); Casenote, Fixtures, Determinable Fees for School
Purposes Ownership of School Building When Land Reverts, 3 VAND. L. REV. 134,
135 (1949). Compare Rumford Falls Power Co. v. Waishwell, 128 Me. 320, 323, 147
A. 343, 344 (1929) (buildings go to improver and may be removed); with Koehler v.
Rowland, 275 Mo. 573, 589, 205 S.W. 217, 222 (1918) (compensation for improve-
ments not allowed).
258. Fratcher, supra note 81, at 509 (1954); Communication and Study Relat-
ing to Limitation of the Duration of Restrictions Voluntarily Imposed on the Use of
Land, 1951 N. Y. L. REVIsIoN COMM'N REP. 689, 703-04 [hereinafter cited as 1951
N.Y. L. REV. COMM'N REP.]. But see supra note 250 (citing authorities to the
contrary).
259. Goldstein, supra note 88, at 253; Simes, supra note 253, at 307. Testimony
presented to the New York Law Revision Commission in 1957 identified a situation
where 279 heirs owned a right of reverter in common. See Acts, supra note 32, at 346.
260. See 1957 A.B.A., supra note 245, at 75 n.8 (relating that a holder of a
right of entry conditioned against the consumption of alcoholic beverages on the prem-
ises in the Miami area charged $90 a lot for its release); see also In re Bangle, 54 Cal.
App. 415, 201 P. 968 (1921); Ascher, supra note 196, at 223, 258 n.45 (relating the
story of a lawyer who bought up possibilities of reverter in a development and sold
releases for several hundred dollars per lot).
261. Simes, supra note 253, at 306.
262. Goldstein, supra note 88, at 252.
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portant problem, however, was the impact of defeasible fees on lending institu-
tions, which were understandably reluctant to finance the purchase of property
subject to the potential of forfeiture for conduct over which they had little
control. 263 Indeed, laws regulating financial institutions in some states forbade
loans on such insecure collateral. 64 Some developers attempted to deal with
this problem by expressly allowing mortgagees to cure violations of conditions
prior to forfeiture.26 5 A more acceptable solution was to change to restrictions
that did not threaten forfeiture.
Abandonment of the use of defeasible fee subdivision restrictions was
counseled by more sophisticated planners and developers, who early recognized
the limitations of conditions.266 Some aspirations of developers, like establish-
ing permanent property owners' associations to manage maintenance fees col-
lected under deed restrictions, 267 could be accomplished only with difficulty
through conditions. Because most jurisdictions at the time did not permit
rights of entry or possibilities of reverter to be transferred, 268 the developer
could not transfer the rights to the property owners' association. The interest
could have initially been created as an executory limitation in the property
owners' association, but then would have been subject to the Rule Against
Perpetuities. 26 9 A well-advised developer could have created an executory limi-
tation in a property owners' association with a duration of less than 21 years,
but the author found no examples of this. Developers saddled with rights of
entry chafed under the responsibility of enforcing deed restrictions. 70 Other
developers found they could restrict property more easily by placing restric-
tions in the original plat or in a declaration of restrictions, an approach possi-
263. H. MONCHOW, supra note 76, at 74; Acts, supra note 32, at 352; Ferrier,
supra note 250, at 518; Goldstein, supra note 88, at 252; Williams, supra note 239, at
201; see RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 52, comment a (1937) (creditors of owner of
defeasible fee are subject to claims of owner of right of entry or possibility of reverter).
264. See Comment, An Illinois Statute Relating to Rights of Entry and Pos-
sibilities of Reverter, 43 ILL. L. REV. 90, 90 n.4 (1948).
265. See O'Malley v. Central Methodist Church, 67 Ariz. 245, 250, 194 P.2d
444, 447 (1948) (heirs of the initial grantor filed an instrument releasing a condition to
the extent that it would invalidate any good faith mortgage); In re Bangle, 54 Cal.
App. 415, 419, 201 P. 968, 970 (1920) (condition not good against mortgagee in good
faith); Franklin County Deeds, book 502, at 556 (1911) ("upon the violation of any or
all of said conditions ...any person holding a lien ...shall have the right . . . of
removing the objectionable features . . . and thereby prevent a forfeiture of his lien").
266. See Taylor, supra note 114, at 182-83.
267. See Bouton, supra note 195, at 25-26; Clarke, Protective Deed Restrictions,
33 NAT. REAL EST. J. 42, 43 (1932) (advocating long term restrictions managed by
property owner associations).
268. See supra note 238.
269. See supra note 91.
270. Harmon, Suburban Real Estate-Financing, Developing and Selling, in
HOMEBUILDING & SUBDIVIDING, supra note 114, at 30, 40; see also Ascher, Reflec-
tions on the Art of Administering Deed Restrictions, 82 LAND & PUB. UTIL. ECON.
373 (1932) (a later source commenting on the difficulty of administering deed restric-
tions even under covenant and neighborhood association schemes).
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ble with equitable servitudes but not with defeasible fees. 2 7 1
Ultimately, the defeasible fee gave way to the equitable servitude as the
restrictive device of choice. For a host of reasons, conditions enforced by for-
feiture were inferior to servitudes enforced by injunction for assuring compli-
ance with deed restrictions. 272 Perhaps the most important development con-
tributing to the ascendancy of the equitable servitude was the maturation by
the end of the nineteenth century of the doctrine of the equitable servitude
common scheme, which permitted developers to impose restrictions on all
properties in a subdivision for the benefit of all others. 27 3 In the end, deed
restrictions generally became less important because of the rise of public land
use control.
274
VIII. LEGAL COMMENTARY ON THE USE OF THE DEFEASIBLE FEE FOR
LAND USE PLANNING
Commentary by legal academics on the use of the defeasible fee for sub-
division deed restrictions seems curiously lacking until very late in the period.
Such commentary as did exist focused on whether the fee simple determinable
had been abolished by the Statute Quia Emptores in 1290.275 Gray so asserted
in his classic treatise on the Rule Against Perpetuities in 1886.276 Challis,
Vance, Powell, and others joined the issue, and the debate raged on until well
into the 1920's.27 7 During this time, oblivious to the battles being waged on
Olympus, developers drafted thousands, perhaps millions of deeds, creating
what certainly could have been interpreted as determinable fees.27a By the
271. J. NICHOLS, supra note 24, at 13.
272. Brake, supra note 80, at 443.
273. See DeGray v. Monmouth Beach Clubhouse Co., 50 N.J. 329, 24 A. 388
(1892), affd, 67 N.J. Eq. 731, 63 A. 1118 (1894); I B. JONES, THE LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY AND CONVEYANCING §§ 771-75 (1896); Keasbey, supra note 71, at 291-
301.
274. See Bassett, Zoning versus Private Restrictions, 23 NATL. REAL EST. J. 26
(1922); Young, City Planning and Restraints on the Use of Property, 9 MINN. L. REV.
518, 593-95 (1925) (early authorities recognizing the superiority of zoning to deed re-
strictions for many purposes). But see S. MOrT & M. WEHRLY, supra note 230, at 4
(1947); Ascher, supra note 196, at 234-37 (arguing the superiority of private restric-
tions to zoning for other purposes); Van Hecke, Zoning Ordinances and Restrictions in
Deeds, 37 YALE L.J. 407 (1928) (comparing zoning and private restrictions).
275. 18 Ed. 1, ch. 1 (1290).
276. See J. GRAY, supra note 245, § 31.
277. Gray, supra note 89, at 399; see also Zane, supra note 89, at 299-300 (ar-
guing in support of Gray). But see Challis, Response, 3 L.Q. REV. 403, 403-04 (1887);
R. POWELL, Determinable Fees, supra note 88 (1923); Vance, Rights of Reverter and
the Statute Quia Emptores, 36 YALE L.J. 593 (1927). It was clear that the fee simple
subject to condition subsequent was not abolished by quia emptores. Bowman, supra
note 88, at 628 (1918).
278. This fact was recognized by Powell near the end of the quia emptores de-
bate. Powell argued that, whatever the merits of Gray's position, determinable fees
were widely used and uniformly upheld by the courts, and thus responsible commenta-
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time that the commentators began to discuss the use of defeasible fees for land
use planning, such use had passed from fashion. The classic article on the
subject appeared in 1940,279 long after drafters had abandoned the defeasible
fee. Developers and their attorneys received little help in dealing with their
problems from academia.
Academic commentary on defeasible fees has not, however, been rare in
this century. Since 1900, over two hundred law review articles, notes, com-
ments, and case comments have appeared discussing defeasible fees. This may
be partly due to the desire of student commentators to employ their knowledge
of future interests so painfully acquired in the first year of law school. It is
also due, undoubtedly, to the tremendous legacy of problems left behind by the
widespread use of defeasible fees for land use control during the period here
under consideration.
IX. THE CLEAN UP OF THE DEBRIS
By 1920, a substantial number of subdivision lots in many states were
subject to forfeiture restrictions appearing somewhere in the chain of title.280
The possibility of forfeiture under most of these provisions was very remote.
First, a court presented with the issue would almost always find a reason for
not permitting a forfeiture.8" More to the point, the issue was seldom raised
as developers, who technically held the power to enforce forfeitures, rarely had
any interest in doing S0.282 Few developers maintained much interest in their
subdivisions once the lots were sold. Nevertheless, forfeiture provisions lurked
insidiously in the background of many properties, perpetually clouding the ti-
tle.283 The construction of a bay window or porch beyond the setback line, the
opening of a professional office in the basement, the sale of the property to a
black family, could raise the long dormant specter of forfeiture.
In most jurisdictions, traditional common law devices, like the Rule
Against Perpetuities, did not limit the duration of this threat.284 As developers
became more sophisticated, they found ways of dealing with the perpetual du-
ration of restrictions. Early on, deeds began appearing with restrictions limited
in duration to a certain number of years.285 Later, more complex provisions
tors had to come to terms with them. Powell, Determinable Fees, supra note 88, at
209-10, 234 (1923).
279. Goldstein, supra note 88.
280. See supra notes 125-47, 176 and accompanying text.
281. See supra notes 231-40 and accompanying text.
282. H. MONCHOW, supra note 76, at 65 (many owners were dissolved corpora-
tions); Acts, supra note 32, at 352.
283. Fratcher, supra note 81, at 520-21; Note, Change of Conditions, supra note
188, at 264.
284. See supra note 245.
285. By the mid-1920's, such provisions were the rule and perpetual restrictions
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appeared for durational limits subject to extension beyond an initial period (or
abandonment) upon the agreement of a certain proportion of residents of the
development.2 86 But indefinite or long term forfeiture restrictions continued to
affect many properties. The possibility of forfeiture, albeit remote, provided a
convenient excuse for a buyer to back out of a sale under a claim of unmarket-
able title,2 87 or for a financial institution to refuse to accept a mortgage.288 It
even, occasionally, provided an opportunity for extortion.289
The most obvious solution to these problems was legislation eliminating
stale or useless defeasible fee restrictions. Such legislation existed in a few
states from the nineteenth century,290 but did not really become popular until
the 1940's.2 11 In the 1940's and 1950's, a number of states passed legislation
limiting in various ways rights of entry and possibilities of reverter.2 9 2 This
legislation took several basic forms. First, several statutes, following the lead
286. H. MONCHOW, supra note 76, at 59-62; J. NICHOLS, supra note 24, at 13;
Bouton, supra note 195, at 26-27; Nichols, supra note 119, at 135; Nichols, supra note
114, at 16.
287. For litigation concerning marketability of title subject to conditions, see In-
gersoll Eng'g & Constr. Co. v. Crocker, 228 F. 844 (6th Cir. 1915); Hoskins v.
Walker, 255 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1953); Van Vliet & Place, Inc. v. Gaines, 249 N.Y. 106,
162 N.E. 600 (1928); Milan v. Towner, 229 A.D. 428, 243 N.Y.S. 483 (1930); Wein-
berg v. Sanders, 204 A.D. 409, 198 N.Y.S. 121 (1923); Zweig v. Sweedler, 140 A.D.
319, 125 N.Y.S. 171 (1910); Richter v. Distelhurst, 116 A.D. 269, 101 N.Y.S. 634
(1906); see also Acts, supra note 32, at 352 (discussing problem of uncertainty of
titles).
288. See authorities cited supra note 263.
289. See supra note 260.
290. MASS. ACTS & RESOLVES 1887 ch. 418; cf. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
184A §§ 1-6 (West 1977); MICH. COMP. LAWS 1857 § 2630 (1857) (cf. MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 554.46 (1980)); 230.46 MINN. GEN. STAT. Ch. 45 & 46 (1866); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 500.20, sub. 1 (1947); REV. STAT. Wis. ch. 56 § 46 (1849); WEST Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 700.15 (1901). See generally Smith v. Barrie, 56 Mich. 314, 22 N.W. 816
(1885) (applying the Michigan statute); Sioux City & St. P. R.R. v. Singer, 49 Minn.
301, 51 N.W. 905 (1892) (applying the Minnesota statute); Note, Possibilities of Re-
verter and Powers of Termination in Michigan, 37 U. DET. L.J. 284, 295-96 (1959)
(discussing the Michigan statute).
291. Goldstein, supra note 88, at 255; see also Clark, Limiting Conditional Re-
strictions, 27 A.B.A. J. 737, 741 (1941) (supporting reverter legislation); Casenote,
Property-Language Necessary to Create a Condition Subsequent, 2 OKLA. L. REV.
247, 250 (1949) (no state had passed a reverter act in sixty years preceding note). A
Uniform Act Relating to Reverters of Realty was proposed in 1944. See HANDBOOK OF
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS OF UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEED-
INGS OF THE FIFTY-FOURTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE 209-10 (1944).
292. A number of sources from the 1940's and 1950's discussed or proposed leg-
islation. See CURRENT TRENDS, supra note 109, at 605-44; 1957 A.B.A., supra note
245, at 11 (1957); Report of Committee on Substantive Changes in Real Property
Principles, PROCEEDINGS OF THE A.B.A SECTIONS ON REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE AND
TRUST 28 (1945); Acts, supra note 32, at 229-30; 1951 N.Y. L. REV. COMM'N REP.,
supra note 258, at 691, 704-05; cf. 4 L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 88, § 1994
(1936 & 1983 Supp.) (identifying current reverter legislation).
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of the early Michigan statute,29 3 purported to eliminate merely nominal condi-
tions.294 Second, a number of statutes imposed specific time limits on the dura-
tion of defeasible fee limitations295 or for assertion of defeasance. 20 One stat-
ute changed defeasible fee restrictions into covenants after a set period of
time.297 Another subjected actions for enforcing conditions or limitations to
defenses available against the enforcement of other forms of restriction.298
Insofar as this legislation was applied retroactively to existing interests, it
troubled many commentators because it seemed to destroy a common law
property interest in violation of the due process and contracts clauses of the
United States and state constitutions."' The Florida Supreme Court struck
down retroactive application of the Florida reverter act in 1954, holding that a
statute voiding conditions after 21 years was invalid under the contracts
clause. 300 The New York Court of Appeals, in 1965, found retroactive applica-
tion of the New York reverter act to take property in violation of both the
contracts and due process clauses. 301 The Illinois Supreme Court, on the other
hand, upheld that state's reverter act in 1955.302 This decision was followed by
293. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 554.46 (1970).
294. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 700.15 (West 1981); Acts, supra note 32, at
281-92.
295. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-97 (1981) (30 years); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 689.18(3) (Supp. 1983) (21 years); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch 30 §§ 37b-37h (Smith-
Hurd 1969) (40 years); Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 381.218, .219 (1972) (30 years); MD. REAL
PROP. CODE ANN. § 6-101 (1981) (30 years); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch 184A, §§ 1-
6 (West 1977) (30 years); NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-2.102 (1981) (30 years); OR. REV.
STAT. § 105.770 (1983) (30 years); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-4-19 (1969) (20 years); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 43-30-8.2 (1981) (10 years, alcoholic beverage conditions);
Acts, supra note 32, at 301-08.
296. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 6-63 (1981) (7 years); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
550.20 (3) (West 1947).
297. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 689.18(7) (1964) (declared unconstitutional as applied
to interests created before its effective date in Biltmore Village, Inc. v. Royal, 71 So. 2d
727 (Fla. 1954)).
298. N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS § 1953(3) (1979).
299. See Clark, supra note 291, at 739; Denissen, supra note 112, at 268-70
(1948); Fratcher, Exorcise the Curse of Reversionary Possibilities, 28 Mo. B.J. 34
(1972); 1957 A.B.A., supra note 245, at 625-38; 1951 N.Y. L. REV. COMM'N REP.,
supra note 258, at 706-11, 715-24; Comment, An Illinois Statute Relating to Right of
Entry and Possibilities of Reverter, 43 ILL. L. REV. 90, 101-03 (1948); Comment,
Proposed Restrictions on Possibilities of Reverter and Rights of Entry, 34 Miss. L.J.
176, 191-96 (1963); Note, Proposed Illinois Statute on Possibility of Reverter and
Right of Entry as Affecting Land Use Policy, 14 U. CHI. L. REV. 638, 646-47 (1947);
Note, Legislation Proposed Statutory Limitation, 1940 Wis. L. REV. 121 (1940).
300. Biltmore Village, Inc. v. Royal, 71 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 1954).
301. Board of Educ. v. Miles, 15 N.Y.2d 364, 207 N.E.2d 181, 259 N.Y.S.2d
129 (1965).
302. Trustees of Schools v. Batdorf, 6 II1. 2d 486, 130 N.E.2d Ill (1955).
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courts in Nebraska, 30 3 Iowa, 304 and Kentucky. 30 5 A recent United States Su-
preme Court decision upholding a statute voiding mineral interests after a
specified time if not preserved by re-recording" 6 also seems to sustain reverter
legislation.
X. CONCLUSION
Though the defeasible fee emerged early as the legal tool for restricting
residential development, its career was brief and far from glorious. It clearly
failed to function as an effective legal restriction on the use and development
of residential property. With rare exceptions, courts were exceedingly reluc-
tant to enforce residential restrictions by the forfeiture of title to property,
even in the face of obvious violations of restrictions. At best, the courts were
only willing to enforce defeasible fees by injunction, effectively treating them
as equitable servitudes. By the conclusion of our period, the flexible and easily
enforced equitable servitude triumphed everywhere over the defeasible fee as
the land use planning tool of choice. Even the real covenant, plagued though it
was with labyrinthian legal complexities, and the negative easement, despite
its fictive character, gained ascendancy over the defeasible fee. In the end,
zoning, subdivision controls, and other public land use planning tools overshad-
owed private restrictions in shaping residential development.
In some jurisdictions, the use of the defeasible fee for restriction of resi-
dential property was fleeting. Developers quickly detected and responded to
the judicial recognition and articulation of the equitable servitude and real
covenant as land use planning devices. But drafters in other jurisdictions clung
doggedly to the defeasible fee for decades as a tool for residential restriction in
the face of its manifest defects and in spite of the ready availability of superior
alternatives.
Wherever the defeasible fee was used as a land use planning device, gen-
erations of lawyers have struggled with the title problems left behind. In many
jurisdictions, however, old forfeiture restrictions now have been rendered inef-
fective by reverter and marketable title legislation. Many other restrictions
have receded beyond the horizons of interest of title insurance companies and
opinion writers. The unfortunate defeasible fee chapter of the history of pri-
vate land use planning in the United States is by and large closed.
303. Hiddleston v. Nebraska Jewish Educ. Soc'y, 186 Neb. 786, 186 N.W.2d
904 (1971).
304. Presbytery of S.E. Iowa v. Harris, 226 N.W.2d 232 (1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 830 (1975).
305. Cline v. Johnson County Bd. of Educ., 548 S.W.2d 507 (Ky. 1977).
306. Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982).
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